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The Shift in United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East Since 1989 
 
 
Brandon M. Ward 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 A bi-polar world emerged at the end of World War II. The United States and the 
Soviet Union were the world’s superpowers and tensions between them spiraled 
consequently bringing about the Cold War. United States foreign policy during the Cold 
War revolved around containment policy. The Middle East during the Cold War was a 
region that the bi-polar world’s superpowers wanted to influence, and protect. The United 
States during the Cold War warned the Soviet Union through presidential doctrines that it 
would fight to keep the Middle East from communism, and the Soviet Union’s influence. 
 The bi-polar international power structure did not allow the United States the 
ability to pick its battles. The power structure that constrained the Cold War forced the 
United States to react to the Soviet Union, and it forced foreign policy makers to always 
consider the Soviet Union’s response to its policies. United States foreign policy in the 
Middle East during the Cold War threatened with military methods to solve local and 
regional instabilities. However, the United States was constrained by the bi-polar world 
thus, it was cautious of committing military troops in the region permanently and 
upsetting the region’s delicate balance of power. 
 iv
 United States foreign policy toward the Middle East has changed between 1981 
and 2006. This change is in the direction of greater use of military methods to resolve 
what various administrations have perceived to be local and regional instability. This 
change in policy is partly attributable to changes in the United States power position in 
the world. A United States foreign policy shift in the Middle East occurred due to a 
change in the distribution of political power within the interstate system. This change has 
had the following result: the United States is no longer constrained by the bi-polar 
international power structure that characterized the Cold War period. 
 The collapse of the Soviet Union created the uni-polar international power 
structure. United States foreign policy is now capable of deploying the military to resolve 
local and regional instabilities in the Middle East, and that deployment has tended to 
become increasingly permanent in nature. 
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Chapter 1— 
United States Middle East Policies: Problems and Context 
—Historical Background— 
 
“Whether by design or by an accident of history, the United States  
assumed a protective role in the Gulf, and it was hard to 
 imagine how it could abdicate this responsibility without causing a 
major shift in the power relationships in the world (Lenczowski 1990, 283).” 
 
 
“Until 1945 the nation-state system was multi-polar, and always with five or more 
powers. In all of modern history the structure of the international politics has changed but 
once (Waltz 1979, 163).” Thus, with the end of World War II the power structure of the 
international system had changed to a bi-polar system with the United States and the 
Soviet Union balancing power, and competing for influence in the post-World War II era. 
In a bi-polar international system, the two superpowers compete over influence, and 
attempt to gain advantage in the self-help system. The competition between the United 
States and the Soviet Union became a competition between two opposing ideologies, and 
a battle over influence, thus giving rise to the Cold War. A strategic area of influence 
between the antagonist superpowers was the Middle East.  
In this chapter, I give an historical background of United States foreign policy in 
the Middle East from the start of the Cold War through the Carter administration. By 
examining, the United States’ foreign policy approach during this period I will establish a 
framework for United States foreign policy during the Cold War in the Middle East, and 
how the bi-polar system influenced United States foreign policy decisions in the Middle 
East. The bi-polar system structured how the United States would respond to crises in the 
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Middle East, supply aid and modern technology, broker peace, and supports its allies 
(Rubin 1987, 453).  In the subsequent chapter, I analyze scholarly research on United 
States foreign policy during the Cold War, and in the post-Cold War in the Middle East.  
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ foreign policy in the Middle 
East has slowly been changing. During the George H.W. Bush administration, some shift 
in Middle East foreign policy began. Examples of this are the Persian Gulf War, and the 
administration’s claim of a “New World Order.” The Clinton administration advanced the 
United States’ Middle East policy to promote “pluralism and liberal values” while 
defending its economic interests in the area (Gerges 1999, 110). The current 
administration of George W. Bush made the War on Terror and spreading freedom its 
main foreign policy initiatives. It also decided to implement military methods to pursue 
these foreign policy initiatives. I hypothesize that the United States’ implementation of 
foreign policy in the Middle East has shifted due to a change in the distribution of 
political power within the interstate system. Chapters 3 through 6, will analyze 
government documents, media coverage to find public statements, and foreign policy 
actions taken by Presidential administrations from 1981-2006. In addition, I use scholarly 
books written on the subjects of United States foreign policy, and the Middle East. I rely 
on secondary materials to describe changes in the United States worldwide power 
position. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will be the main indicator 
of a change in worldwide distribution of power from bi-polar to uni-polar. I evaluate the 
Cold War United States foreign policy from 1981 through 1988, the shift of United States 
foreign policy in the post-Cold War from 1989 through 2006, and the impact created by 
the United States’ sole superpower status on its foreign policy towards the Middle East. 
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This change had the following result: the United States is no longer constrained by a bi-
polar distribution of power that characterized the Cold War period, thus allowing United 
States foreign policy to use more offensive military methods in the Middle East to 
achieve United States foreign policy goals of providing security and stability to the 
regions natural resources, pushing forward the Arab-Israeli peace process, opening-up the 
Middle East economy, bringing freedom to citizens of the region, and democratization. 
The Start of the Cold War—    
In February 1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Josef Stalin 
meet at the Yalta Conference to discuss World War II peace arrangements. The Yalta 
Conference established when the nations of Europe are liberated following the war, each 
nation will establish governments of its own choosing, through free and fair elections. As 
World War II was ending, the Soviet Union began expanding in Eastern Europe and was 
establishing communist governments in nations that fell under the path of Soviet 
expansion. The Soviet Union’s actions were a flagrant violation of the agreements 
reached at Yalta (Ohaegbulam 1999, 27-28). Tensions between the Soviet Union and the 
United States kept rising in the aftermath of World War II. As the Soviet Union was 
expanding influence in Eastern Europe it never withdrew its military. This was seen as a 
threatening act against the West. Additionally, the Soviet Union challenged the United 
States in strategic nations such as Greece, Turkey, and Iran. In 1947, in defiance of 
Soviet aggression President Truman espoused the Truman Doctrine. President Truman 
feared that if Greece fell to the Soviet Union, Turkey would subsequently fall, thus 
jeopardizing the stability of the Middle East region, and threaten the United States’ 
national security and interest. The Truman Doctrine marked the beginning of the Cold 
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War between the United States and the Soviet Union. President Truman implemented 
George Kennan’s containment strategy as the United States’ foreign policy towards the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War. Containment policy would be central in the making of 
United States foreign policy for the next five decades. 
Truman Administration 1945-1953—  
 With the sudden death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt on April 12, 1945, 
Harry S Truman became President of the United States. President Truman’s immediate 
foreign policy decisions were focused on ending World War II. The United States and its 
allies won the European theater on May 8, 1945, subsequently achieving victory over 
Japan on September 2, 1945. October 24, 1945 the United States ratified the Charter of 
the United Nations. The United Nations was a part of United States post-World War II 
foreign policy designed to “establish a global system of collective security, led by the 
United States, to prevent future wars (1999, 146).”    
 The United States and the Soviet Union were left in the aftermath of World War 
II as the world’s superpowers. However, in the latter stages of World War II animosity 
between the two powers had been growing, and by the end of World War II the 
relationship between each nation was strained. The threat of the Soviet Union expanding 
communism and influence caused United States foreign policy to follow the containment 
strategy set forth by George Kennan. 
In 1947, the Soviet Union attempted to “ratify the Soviet-Iranian oil agreement 
(Lenczowski 1990, 12).” This agreement would give the Soviet Union control over 
Iranian oil with a 51 percent ownership (1990, 12). The United States condemned Soviet 
actions in Iran. The United States supported the Iranians in voting against the agreement, 
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and President Truman forced Josef Stalin to withdrawal Soviet troops from Iran (1990, 
12-13). Iran’s oil supply and geographic proximity to the Soviet Union made it a vital 
ally in containing communism.    
 President Truman addressed Congress on March 12, 1947,  an espoused the 
Truman Doctrine. The doctrine assisted Turkey and Greece by giving $400 million in aid 
to prevent each nation from collapsing to Soviet pressure and influence. The aid supplied 
political, military, and economic assistance in order to contain the threat of communism 
in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East. “The Truman Doctrine and its support 
by Congress marked the beginning of the United States’ commitment to a global strategy 
against communist and Soviet threats (Ohaegbulam 1999, 31).” 
 “On May 14, 1948, the State of Israel was proclaimed in Tel Aviv…within eleven 
minutes of Israel’s proclamation of statehood the president gave de facto recognition of 
the newly created Jewish state (Lenczowski 1990, 26)” The United States shortly after 
the recognition of the Jewish state began to give it financial assistance. 
 During President Truman’s presidency the United States became one of two 
world superpowers. Thus, United States foreign policy could not retreat into pre-war 
isolationism. The bi-polar world positioned the United States versus the Soviet Union in a 
battle for global influence. The Truman administration took actions to insure that the 
Soviet Union did not gain influence over the Middle East’s oil reserves, or control the 
fate of the state of Israel. The foreign policy of containment established during the 
Truman presidency would become a model for United States foreign policy during the 
Cold War.  
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Eisenhower Administration 1953-1961— 
 When President Eisenhower was inaugurated there was immediate concern over 
the Iranian oil crisis. Iran’s Premier Mossadegh tried to break ties with the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company due to inadequate profit sharing; he attempted to gain the shah’s political 
powers, consequently communist influence was rising in Iran (1990, 32, 36). Premier 
Mossadegh became such a political liability that United States and the British devised a 
plan “to ensure his removal from office and the restoration of the shah’s authority (1990, 
37).” When Mossadegh was removed from power, and the shah’s power was restored, the 
United States and Iran began an era of close cooperation. Iran was an ally of the United 
States in the struggle to contain communism. 
The United States promised Egypt financial assistance to help build a 
hydroelectric dam in Aswan, Egypt. But “in 1956, President Gamal Abdul Nasser of 
Egypt obtained weapons from the Soviet Union,” the Eisenhower administration 
immediately cancelled assistance funds for the dam (Ohaegbulam 1999, 78). Therefore, 
in order to fund the dam project President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. The canal 
operated under an “international, Paris-based company (Lenczowski 1990, 41),” until the 
Egyptian takeover. The canal’s takeover enraged the British and the French, thus plans 
were made for military action against Egypt. Israel who was prohibited from the use of 
the canal allied with the British and French. When the fighting broke out the Israelis took 
control of positions in the Sinai Peninsula, and the Gaza Strip, and the British and French 
attacked strategic positions from the air (1990, 43). The events around the nationalization 
of the Suez Canal exasperated President Eisenhower. His concern was the actions of the 
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British, French, and Israelis would upset the delicate balance in the Middle East, and 
allow the Soviet Union to penetrate influence within the region with arms deals. 
 On January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower presented a plan to Congress to inhibit 
the support of communism in the Middle East. President Eisenhower claimed the Soviet 
Union’s interest in the Middle East is based around “power politics (1990, 52).” Thus, the 
Eisenhower Doctrine proposed “three types of action: to develop economic strength of 
Middle East nations; to enact programs of military assistance and cooperation;” allow 
Middle East nations to employ the United States military against international communist 
threats to territory, or sovereignty (1990, 52).       
 President Nasser’s Pan-Arabism not only created tension in the Middle East, but 
with the United States. In Syria, the Baath Socialist Party and the Communist Party 
gained influence in Syria’s “rapid process pf radicalization both in her internal politics 
and in her foreign policy (1990, 54).” Both Egypt and Syria allied with the Soviet Union, 
furthermore making military arms, and economic deals with Moscow (1990, 55). The rise 
of Syria’s leftist parties discouraged its neighbors Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and 
Israel. President Eisenhower fearing Soviet penetration in the Middle East began 
following the Eisenhower Doctrine to attempt to control the crisis developing in Syria. 
By using the doctrine President Eisenhower was able to prevent Syria’s neighbors from 
taking military action against them, thus keeping the Soviet Union out of military 
involvement within the Middle East. 
 Pan-Arabism eventually was matched by nearly every Arab regime on the basis of 
resisting Pan-Arab ideology, and its intimate ties with the Soviet Union. President 
Eisenhower during his administration had to balance the situation developing in the 
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Middle East, with its correlation to the containment of communism and the Soviet’s 
response to the United States’ action within the Middle East region. 
Kennedy Administration 1961-1963—  
 President Kennedy’s residence in the White House coincided with tensions in the 
Middle East among radical and conservative governments. Egypt’s President Gamal 
Abdul Nasser was the key figure behind Arab radicalism in the region. “Thus relations 
with Cairo by the time Kennedy came to power have been aptly described as being in a 
“deep freeze” (1990, 72).” President Kennedy approached the Middle East cautiously. He 
made clear his intentions of protecting Israel, with the sale of weapons. Additionally, 
President Kennedy changed the United States’ relationship with Israel by expressing his 
intentions of forming closer ties with Israel. This “was illustrated by the comprehensive 
political guarantees that were made to Israel. These guarantees did not only include 
security, but also extended to such specific matters as interpretations of territorial 
boundaries and water allocations from the Jordan (Miglietta 2002, 133).” However, he 
was able to thaw the United States’ relationship with Cairo, by treating President Nasser 
as an important ally. Thus, Kennedy informed President Nasser about the United States’ 
deals and intentions at certain times in order to keep the Egyptian president informed. 
The greatest act of goodwill in the United States-Cairo relationship during the Kennedy 
administration was the PL-480 Food Program, which provided wheat to Egyptian citizens 
(Lenczowski 1990, 76-77).  
 In 1962, Yemen had a coup d’état. The Yemen monarchy was overthrown and 
replaced by revolutionaries who claimed that Yemen was a republic. President Nasser of 
Egypt assisted the republican movement, in the spirit of Pan-Arabism. Saudi Arabia gave 
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refuge to the overthrown king. Saudi Arabia and Jordan assisted the royalists in a 
counterrevolution (1990, 79-80). However, the revolution was upheld and President 
Kennedy recognized the Republic of Yemen. It was a delicate situation in the Middle 
East for the administration. The United States did not want to turn its back on Saudi 
Arabia, or appear to give in to Nasser, most importantly it did not want to appear to not 
support modernizing movements in the Middle East (1990, 84).  
 The Kennedy administration abruptly ended November 22, 1963, when the 
President was assassinated in Dallas, Texas. President Kennedy’s foreign policy in the 
Middle East did not achieve in dramatic success, however he did prevent crisis in the 
Middle East from becoming debacles.  
Johnson Administration 1963-1969— 
 President Johnson early in his administration did little to stray from the previous 
Middle East policies of Kennedy. The Johnson administration had other foreign policy 
goals taking precedent over the Middle East, such as escalating problems in Vietnam. 
However, a crisis did occur on the island of Cyprus in the Mediterranean Sea. The 
islands’ Greek, and Turkish heritage, were having disputes across cultural backgrounds. 
It was imperative for President Johnson to bring a diplomatic end to the crisis in order to 
prevent Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey from going to war over problems stemming from 
Cyprus. Preventing war was essential to containment. War would allow Soviet influence 
into the Middle East, and Eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus’ President Makarios was close 
with the Soviet Union, and in 1964 “called for military intervention by the Soviet Union 
(1990, 103).” Fighting continued on the island of Cyprus, as well as bickering between 
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Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, then the conflict on Cyprus took less precedence with the 
outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. 
 The United States popularity in the Middle East since the end of World War II 
had gone from moderate and impartial, but during Johnson’s administration the United 
States leaned pro-Israeli, so “from 1967 on the United States emerged as the most 
distrusted if not actually the most hated country in the Middle East (1990, 105).” 
President Johnson’s policies towards Israel led to the sale of offensive military weapons, 
assuring Israel’s military superiority in the Middle East (Miglietta 2002, 139). 
           The Six-Day Arab-Israeli War of 1967, stemmed from disputes between Israel and 
Arab nations. Water rights on the Jordan River were creating tensions in the Middle East 
in the 1960’s, then President Nasser of Egypt proclaimed a blockade of Israeli shipping 
on the Strait of Tiran, and sought the removal of United Nations troops in Egypt’s Sinai 
Peninsula, thus moving the region closer to war. 
 Israel took President Nasser’s actions as an opportunity for a preemptive attack on 
Egypt, thus Israel mobilized its military (Lenczowski 1990, 107). On June 5, 1967, the 
Israeli military attacked Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. The Israeli military conquered the 
Sinai Peninsula up to the Suez Canal, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. After the 
war “six Arab states—Egypt (U.A.R.), Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Algeria, and Sudan—broke 
diplomatic relations with the United States (1990, 112-113).” Additionally, Egypt, Syria, 
Iraq, Algeria, and South Yemen strengthened economic and military connections with the 
Soviet Union. 
 President Johnson’s foreign policies towards the Middle East did not create 
stability in the region. His administration set a precedent for a United States-Israel 
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support. The United States’ support for Israel and the proven effectiveness of its military 
helped create a balance in the Middle East against the developing alliances within the 
region with the Soviet Union. The result of President Johnson’s administration and the 
“1967 war was to intensify regional instability (Miglietta 2002, 138).” 
Nixon Administration 1969-1974—   
 “The nation in 1969 seemed more divided than at any time since the Civil War 
(Melanson 2005, 45).” President Nixon was resolute in changing the United States’ 
foreign policy direction. When he entered into the White House the United States was 
involved in the Vietnam War, Israel and Egypt were in an entrenched stalemate at the 
Suez Canal, Arab nations were rebelling against the United States and its pro-Israeli 
foreign policy, and the Soviet Union was gaining influence around the globe, particularly 
in Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. President Nixon espoused what became known as 
the Nixon Doctrine, as part of his foreign policy agenda for getting the United States less 
involved in international crises. The Nixon Doctrine advocated keeping our treaty 
commitments; the United States will give military arms, or economic assistance to 
countries that are threatened and viewed as allies or essential to United States national 
security, but responsibility will be given to countries to protect itself, “except for the 
threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons (Kissinger 1979, 224).” 
 The Nixon Doctrine came about during a vulnerable time in the Middle East. At 
the beginning of 1972 Great Britain was renouncing its imperial status, and withdrawing 
troops from the Persian Gulf, leaving a power vacuum in the region (Lenczowski 1990, 
117). United States foreign policy leaders used the guiding principles of the Nixon 
Doctrine to “fill this strategic gap by building up the militaries of Iran and Saudi Arabia 
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and fostering their close cooperation (Miglietta 2002, 48).” Vital to President Nixon’s 
foreign policy was containing communism and preventing Soviet infiltration in the 
Middle East. Nixon viewed the Soviet Union as the main source of Middle East 
instability. 
 On Yom Kippur / Ramadan October 6, 1973, Egypt attacked Israel’s positions on 
the Sinai Peninsula. “Simultaneously, Syria attacked Israeli positions in the Golan 
Heights (Lenczowski 1990, 129).” Israel was being pushed-back by the Egyptians and 
Syrians. The United States in order to gain more influence over Israel and its policies in 
the Middle East’s land dispute decided to supply Israel with military arms, and economic 
assistance. The Arab nations struck back at the United States for supporting Israel during 
the war. “The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cut back its oil 
production, embargoed oil exports to the United States… and quadrupled oil prices. 
Although the embargo was eventually lifted, the United States had become well aware of 
its dependence on foreign energy and on its economic interdependence with the rest of 
the world (Papp, Johnson, and Endicott. 2005, 172-173).” 
 President Nixon during this time was in the middle of the Watergate Scandal. 
Nixon entrusted Kissinger to prevent escalation of the war in the Middle East. A cease-
fire supported by the United Nations was accepted by the warring nations. However, in 
the Sinai Peninsula Israeli forces surrounded the Egyptian Third Army (Lenczowski 
1990, 130). The Soviet Union began aggressive dialogue towards the United States and 
Israel, claiming it would send Soviet troops to the Sinai Peninsula. President Nixon 
adamant on keeping the Soviet Union out of the Middle East crisis “put all United States 
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conventional and nuclear forces on military alert (1990, 131),” then warned the Soviet 
Union about unilateral action in the Middle East. 
 President Nixon resigned after the disclosure of the Watergate Scandal. His 
administration typified the containments yoke around United States foreign policy during 
the Cold War. The United States’ national interest in the Middle East during the Cold 
War was to aid Israel, contain the Soviet Union, and keep oil supplies flowing to the 
United States and its allies. The Nixon administration showed the delicate balance in the 
Middle East, and how important the region is to United States security, and economic 
interests. The Nixon Presidency brought the United States-Israeli alliance closer, thus 
changing the United States’ evenhanded approach to foreign policy in the Middle East. 
Ford Administration 1974-1977—  
 After abusing presidential power Richard Nixon resigned as President of the 
United States, leaving Gerald Ford as President. President Ford continued most of 
Nixon’s foreign policy plans. Ford attempted to continue Nixon’s détente strategy for 
guiding United States-Soviet Union relations. However, United States-Soviet Union 
relations became strained due to crises in Africa, and the Cubans getting involved 
internationally aided by the Soviet Union. The United States’ détente policy had one 
exemption; it specifically wanted to keep the Soviet Union out of the Middle East 
negotiations after the Yom Kippur / Ramadan War of 1973 (1990, 141).  
 During President Ford’s administration tensions in Cyprus erupted again. Turkey 
invaded Cyprus after Greece orchestrated a coup d’état of the Cyprus government. The 
new Cyprus government asserted its intentions to join Cyprus with Greece. The new 
government on Cyprus was weak, and ineffective due to political instability on Greece. 
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Turkey thus extended its occupation of the eastern Mediterranean island so it controlled 
forty percent of Cyprus (1990, 143). In response to Turkey’s aggressive actions the 
United States Congress banned arms sales to Turkey. Turkey’s reaction to the United 
States was swift and acute. Turkey banned the use of United States military bases in 
Turkey, sought arms deals via the Soviet Union; Turkey banned United States ships 
access to Turkish ports and military flights, lastly permitting Soviet military vessels to 
pass through the Turkish Straits (1990, 144-146). The tensions between the United States 
and Turkey were not resolved during the Ford presidency.  
 President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger attempted to bring peace to 
the Middle East, specifically between Israel and Egypt. President Ford grew increasingly 
frustrated with peace negotiations, due to Israel’s belligerence. Ford then ended new aid 
to Israel until it became open-minded towards meaningful negotiations. An agreement 
was reached between Egypt and Israel on September 1, 1975 (1990, 151-152). The 
agreement “provided for an expansion of United States military and economic aid, as 
well as agreeing to supply Israel with the oil it would lose from giving back the Sinai oil 
fields (Miglietta 2002, 142).”  
 The Ford administration left problems with Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus 
unresolved. However, despite tensions between the United States and Israel during his 
administration, Israel became one of the world’s most formidable armies. 
Carter Administration 1977-1981—     
 President Carter’s initial foreign policy focused on human rights issues, bringing 
peace to the Middle East, and supporting détente. President Carter believed the Arab-
Israeli conflict had been stalemated to long. He wanted to bring a peaceful end to the 
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conflict before tensions sparked in the Middle East again, or the Soviet Union got 
involved in the situation. President Carter “strove to have a peace that would be based on 
UN Resolution 242 of 1967 (Lenczowski 1990, 160).” The Egypt-Israeli tensions thus 
became a focal point for the Carter administration. President Carter invited Egyptian 
President Anwar al-Sadat and Israel Prime Minister Menachem Begin to Camp David 
Maryland, where he would lead negotiations between the two nations. After several days 
of secret negotiations a framework for peace in the Middle East, and between Egypt and 
Israel was signed. “The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt 
and Israel” had several key principles: Egypt would regain full control of the Sinai 
peninsula; freedom of Israel’s use of international waterways and overflights in 
previously restricted Egypt territory; Egypt and Israel would begin normal relations after 
signing a peace treaty (1990, 177). The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty was signed on 
March 26, 1979.  
 During the latter half of the 1970’s the United States’ policeman of the Persian 
Gulf, the Shah of Iran was ousted from power and an Islamic fundamentalist became 
Iran’s new leader the Ayatollah Khomeini. His Islamic republic caught United States 
foreign policy officials off-guard (Gerges 1999, 64). As leader of the new Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Khomeini confiscated private property, occupied private homes, 
changed women’s dress, and redistributed wealth among the poor (Lenczowski 1990, 
198). The impact of the Iranian revolution was seen throughout the Middle East region. 
“United States diplomats and embassies were attacked and burned in Pakistan, Libya, 
Kuwait, and Afghanistan (Gerges 1999, 66).” The Iran hostage crisis left the United 
States and Carter administration feeling frustrated and powerless. “The hostage crisis 
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revealed an element of vulnerability in the United States and other democracies, 
demonstrating that terrorists’ methods could be used successfully to achieve their 
objectives (Lenczowski 1990, 203).” 
 President Carter during the second-half of his term in office faced many 
challenges coming from the Middle East. The Iranian revolution, and Iranian hostage 
crisis were serious threats to United States national interests, but the Soviet Union’s 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was viewed as one of the biggest crises of the Cold War. 
The Soviet Union was impending on the Middle East and upsetting the sensitive balance 
of power in the region. If the Soviet Union could gain a foothold in the Middle East 
through conquering Afghanistan it potentially could gain access to the oil rich Persian 
Gulf region. President Carter in his 1980 State of the Union Address espoused the United 
States foreign policy response to the Soviet Union’s advance in Afghanistan. The Carter 
Doctrine stated: “Any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf 
region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of 
America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military 
force (Ohaegbulam 1999, 41).”1  
 President Carter during his administration was deeply involved in the Middle 
East. However, his administration never developed clear foreign policy towards the 
Middle East (Gerges 1999, 68). The Carter Doctrine was aimed at the containment of 
communism, and United States oil interests not the Middle East. “In the American mind, 
populist, revolutionary Islam came to be associated with terrorism and the promotion of 
                                                 
1 President Jimmy Carter, “State of the Union Address,” (January 23 1980): Weekly Compilations of 
Documents XVI (23 January 1980), pp. 194-200 In, F. Ugboaja Ohaegbulam. 1999. A Concise Introduction 
To American Foreign Policy. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc.  
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subversive activities (1999, 69). It is not surprising that with the foreign policy issues 
faced by President Carter he was replaced after one term in office. 
Conclusion—             
 The United States’ containment policy during the Cold War influenced its foreign 
policy in the Middle East. The three main concerns in the Middle East for the United 
States were oil, protecting Israel, and containing communism made the United States’ 
foreign policy in the region defensive, reactive, and pragmatic. The burden of having to 
balance the Soviet Union’s response to foreign policy, and the Arab-Israeli response was 
a tremendous responsibility in a bi-polar world. The United States sought peace and 
stability within the Middle East region in order to prevent Middle Eastern countries from 
taking sides between the two superpowers. Preventing war was essential to containment 
policy. Thus, the United States was willing to support authoritarian regimes in the Middle 
East on the basis they did not support communism, in order to maintain a favorable 
balance of power within the region. The Middle East’s geographic proximity with the 
Soviet Union gave it a perceived advantage for influence in the region. The Middle 
Eastern nations during the Cold War were seemingly pawns in a chess match between 
two superpowers. The bi-polar system did not encourage the United States to execute 
foreign policy goals by using the United States military. United States foreign policy 
options were limited in the bi-polar system, and in order to prevent war between the two 
superpowers the United States avoided war and direct military involvement at all costs 
within the Middle East. The United States if given a provocation that threatened Israel, 
oil, or involved nuclear weapons the military was placed in the proximity of the Middle 
East for an immediate response to such a threat.
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—Chapter 2— 
Scholarly Accounts of United States Foreign Policy: 1945-2005 
—Literature Review— 
 
 
 In chapter 1, I outlined the United States’ foreign policy towards the Middle East 
during the Cold War through the Carter administration. The containment policy practiced 
by the United States influenced its foreign policy towards the Middle East. The United 
States was concerned with protecting the Middle East’s oil, protecting Israel, and 
preventing the Soviet Union from expanding influence in the Middle East. Thus, keeping 
the region’s delicate power balance under the United States’ influence was imperative in 
the bi-polar international power structure.   
 In chapter 2, I analyze claims by scholars on United States foreign policy towards 
the Middle East during the Cold War, and United States foreign policy towards the 
Middle East in the post-Cold War. Researching previous works on the topic will allow 
me to conclude this chapter with an evaluation of similarities, and differences among 
scholars on United States foreign policy towards the Middle East. After analyzing the 
literature, I determine if the United States’ foreign policy objectives in the Middle East in 
the post-Cold War changed, or if its method for achieving foreign policy goals shifted 
due to the influence of the uni-polar international power structure.  
The literature review will focus on the last presidential administration of the Cold 
War through the present administration of George W. Bush. I focus on the last 
presidential administration of the Cold War to show that policies were pragmatic and 
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constrained by the bi-polar international system, and shaped by the United States’ 
containment policy. Then by researching the three post-Cold War administrations I will 
be able to evaluate the United States’ foreign policy changes in the Middle East in a uni-
polar world. 
Organization— 
In this literature review, I divided the literature into two categories, thus 
organizing each scholar’s contribution to United States foreign policy towards the Middle 
East. First, I review scholarship focusing on what if any differences do authors claim 
about the Cold War and post-Cold War United States foreign policy in the Middle East.  
The second section will review what scholars claim about post-Cold War United States 
foreign policy in the Middle East only. By dividing the literature review into two 
categorical sections I will be able to evaluate United States foreign policy shifts from the 
Cold War to the post-Cold War by the similarities and differences of each scholar.   
Literature-Cold War & Post-Cold War Analysis— 
Steven L. Spiegel wrote an essay in the book Eagle Adrift called “Eagle in the 
Middle East.” With the collapse of the bi-polar world some global tensions eased while 
others strengthened, this was especially true for “Africa and the Persian Gulf (1997, 
295)” in the post-Cold War world. The Middle East plays a strategic role in United States 
foreign policy making for three reasons: oil, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction which Spiegel claims “the most serious worldwide danger in the post-Cold 
War era (1997, 296),” and the threat of nuclear weapons from “Islamic fundamentalism 
and/ or domestic extremism (1997, 296)” to United States allies in the region. In order to 
understand the changes within United States foreign policy in regards to the Middle East 
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Spiegel wants to compare Cold War versus post-Cold War interests, and situations (1997, 
297). 
 Spiegel claims that the Cold War United States foreign policy strategy regarding 
the Middle East was fourfold. First, the United States wanted to contain Soviet expansion 
into the region. Second, oil was critical for the United States and its allies. Third, the 
United States wanted to expand diplomatic relations with Arab states, in order to 
influence their loyalty in a bi-polar world. Finally, protecting Israel was an imperative 
and it was a democratic nation in the Middle East (1997, 297-298). These policies are not 
much different from the post-Cold War objectives of United States foreign policy. The 
difference comes from “Arab radicals and potential challengers to the United States have 
no superpower to which they can turn for aid or for arms assistance and support in case 
they begin to lose a war (1997, 302).” Soviet bankrolling and diplomatically supporting 
Arab resistance to the Jewish state were no longer a threat to the region. Thus, leaving 
fewer restraints on the Arab-Israeli peace process (1997, 303).  
 Spiegel believes that the United States in the post-Cold War world has to leave 
troops in the Middle East region. This is necessitated by the fact that there is no “regional 
gendarme (1997, 304).” The Soviet threat has left the Middle East region only to be 
replaced with regional intimidators, and enemies to the United States. Iran and Iraq are 
apart of the Clinton administrations “dual containment” in the Middle East. United States 
foreign policy in the Middle East is more flexible in the post-Cold War. However, 
domestic pressures cause United States foreign policy leaders to lessen the importance of 
the Middle East region.  
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 Spiegel’s essay was a succinct analysis of United States foreign policy in the 
Middle East in the post-Cold War. The role of Israel and the United States’ connection 
with them is vividly seen in his work, and the Arab-Israeli peace process seems to be an 
underlying tension across the board in the Middle East. Spiegel’s greatest concern was 
weapons of mass destruction. The proliferation of the weapons in the Middle East he 
believed was going to potentially have a grave effect on the region. 
In F. Ugboaja Ohaegbulam’s book A Concise Introduction To American Foreign 
Policy, he gives an historical and structural account of United States foreign policy from 
its conception through the middle of the Clinton administration, while establishing 
throughout the book America’s motivations behind its policy. Ohaegbulam gives a 
comprehensive background of United States foreign policy; modern United States foreign 
policy does not begin until World War II. The United States up until that point had 
played minor role in international politics, due to the Monroe Doctrine and its isolationist 
attitude from the time of George Washington. The end of World War II put the United 
States and the Soviet Union in possession of world power. The United States and the 
Soviet Union’s ideological differences and the Soviet’s “flagrant violation (Ohaegbulam 
1999, 27)” of the 1945 Yalta Agreement, raised tensions between the two superpowers 
and escalated into nearly a half-century Cold War.  
 United States foreign policy during the Cold War was centered on the concept of 
containment. The containment mission was to prevent the spread communism, and Soviet 
influence (1999, 28, 29). The containment strategy affected United States foreign policy 
towards the Middle East from the start of the Cold War into the post-Cold War world. 
United States foreign policy leaders devoted tremendous resources to fighting the Cold 
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War, however these leaders did not reflect sufficiently on the world power structure in a 
post-Cold War world (1999, 366). United States foreign policy leaders failed to address 
issues “such as the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism (1999, 366).” 
 Ohaegbulam concludes the Reagan administration followed the Reagan doctrine. 
This doctrine espoused, “assisting nationalists rebels, called “freedom fighters,” against 
Soviet and communist supported governments in the third world (1999, 42).” The Reagan 
doctrine assisted the “freedom fighters” in Afghanistan who were opposing the Soviet 
invasion. The United States containment strategy was a major contributor to the end of 
the Cold War, and “left America without a single great power or coalition of powers as a 
“clear and present danger” to its national security (1999, 44).” 
 The end of the Cold War created a uni-polar world power structure, with the 
United States as the leader. The end of the bi-polar world did not make the world more 
peaceful, it actually became less secure and with increased violence (1999, 46). Iraq’s 
dictator Saddam Hussein invaded the sovereign state of Kuwait, which threatened the 
stability of the entire Middle East region. George H.W. Bush believed that the United 
Nations should play a greater role in the post-Cold War, led by the United States. United 
Nations coalition troops and United States. troops defeated Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in 
Operation Desert Storm. President Bush implemented his ‘New World Order’ strategy by 
using the United Nations as a vital part of United States foreign policy. 
 Ohaegbulam, claims that George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton had similar “foreign 
policy perspectives (1999, 49).” Clinton believed in multilateral United Nations solutions 
like George H.W. Bush, despite the failed mission in Somalia in 1993. Clinton often used 
economic sanctions against countries of the Middle East. The1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions 
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Act “authorized the imposition of sanctions against foreign companies investing more 
than $40 million in either Iran or Libya (1999, 157).” Clinton often used diplomacy or the 
threat of force when dealing with Saddam Hussein. In 1998 President Clinton assembled 
public support for air-strikes against Iraq’s Saddam Hussein who was continuing to build 
weapons of mass destruction, despite the country’s obligation to disband “large scale 
weapons of mass destructions (1999, 160)” after the 1991 Gulf War.  
 Ohaegbulam’s book established the unity, and simplicity that containment 
provided to United States foreign policy. With the collapse of the bi-polar world and the 
rise of the uni-polar world Ohaegbulam suggests that a lack of consensus on United 
States foreign policy in the post-Cold War has caused the United States to take multiple 
approaches towards its national interests: “an economic approach, neoisolationist 
approach, unilateralism, and mulitlateralism under United States leadership (1999, 367-
370).” Ohaegbulam does not claim that any of these approaches are the direction that 
United States foreign policy should follow, rather that the United States should continue 
making pragmatic foreign policy decisions “on a case-by-case basis (1999, 372).”  
Richard A. Melanson in his book American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam 
War outlines United States foreign policy from President Nixon, to George W. Bush. He 
researches whether any of the post-Vietnam War presidents created a foreign policy 
consensus equal to that of the pre-Vietnam War era. Melanson uses public opinion polls 
to show how the United States public reacts to the post-Vietnam War presidential 
policies. The importance of public opinion to the post-Vietnam presidents was “the 
salience of foreign policy issues for the public declined in the wake of Vietnam 
(Melanson 2005, 17),” domestic issues were now a far greater anxiety.  
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 In the evaluation of the post-Vietnam presidents, Melanson gives a 
comprehensive evaluation of each administration’s foreign policy. Analyzing all aspects 
of each administration’s policies allows Melanson to search for a foreign policy 
consensus among the post-Vietnam presidents. However, the Middle East plays a 
significant role in each post-Vietnam presidential administration. President Reagan uses 
the Reagan Doctrine to “unseat Third World Communist governments (2005, 142).”  This 
policy involved low involvement for the United States and allowed it an effective tool to 
“chip away at the periphery of the Soviet empire (2005, 142).” President Reagan foreign 
policy towards the Middle East centered on containing communism. The United States 
and the Soviet Union had vital interests in the Middle East. The United States needed to 
protect the indispensable resources in the Middle East from the Soviet Union. 
Additionally, the Palestinian-Israeli peace-process would be crippled if it fell under 
Soviet control (2005, 166).  
 When the Cold War ended the United States was now the world’s sole 
superpower. This left the United States with foreign policy decisions “quite unlike those 
of the Cold War or the post-Vietnam era (2005, 27).” In September 1990, George H.W. 
Bush announced a “new world order” was imminent and that Iraqi aggression constituted 
its first challenge (2005, 209).” President Bush’s new world order required the United 
States to take a more dynamic role in global affairs. The new world order declared that 
new threats faced the world that did not exist during the Cold War. “The president argued 
that “terrorism, hostagetaking, renegade regimes with unpredictable rulers, new sources 
of instability—all require a strong and engaged America” with military “forces able to 
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respond to threats in whatever corner of the globe they may occur.”2 While establishing a 
new foreign policy in the aftermath of the Cold War, President Bush encouraged global 
leadership for the United States. Global leadership was a foreign policy strategy that 
attempted to maintain the uni-polar world, and protect the Eurasian landmass from 
potential enemies, and threats (2005, 212).   
 Bill Clinton was the only post-Cold War president Melanson claims (2005, 233). 
The foreign policy situation inherited by President Clinton compelled the White House to 
respond to multiple international crises in the first years of his presidency. The Clinton 
administration responded to these crises under the United Nations’ banner, however 
public, and congressional pressure after the failed Operation Restore Hope in Somalia 
forced President Clinton to issue PDD-25. The directive changed the way in which the 
United States foreign policy would be conducted, and the United States relationship with 
the United Nations. PDD-25 “rejected the idea of a permanent UN army, endorsed 
multilateral missions only if they served United States interests, and warned that strict 
conditions would have to be met before the United States would support any 
peacekeeping initiative (2005, 244).”  
 During Clinton’s administration he faced many foreign policy challenges from the 
Middle East. The Iranian President Mohammed Khatami began moderate rhetoric that 
nearly brought the United States and Iran to negotiations, until they tested “missiles with 
and eight-hundred-mile range in July 1998 (2005, 258).” President Clinton also had to 
deal with the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. His policies toward Iraq called for five 
                                                 
2 President George H.W. Bush, “Remarks at the Aspen Institute Symposium in Aspen, Colorado,” (August 
2, 1990), pp. 1190, 1191. In Richard A. Melanson. United States Foreign Policy Since The Vietnam War, 
4th ed. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Publishing, Inc.  
  26 
 
mandates: unrestricted United Nations arms inspectors access to suspected sites; 
economic sanctions toward Iraq; find and support Iraqis that could potential lead a fight 
against Saddam Hussein; enforce northern and southern no-fly zones imposed in 1991; 
protect the Kurds from Saddam Hussein (2005, 258-259). Saddam Hussein did not 
cooperate well with the United Nations arms inspectors, and would not allow them access 
to certain presidential palaces. Saddam Hussein’s continued defiance of the United 
Nations and the United States compelled the United States foreign policy toward Iraq to 
shift. This shift came in the form of air strikes against Iraqi targets suspected of the 
capability to manufacture weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (2005, 258-260).  
    President Clinton was the first and last post-Cold War president according to 
Melanson. The events of September 11, 2001 changed United States foreign policy and 
shaped George W. Bush’s presidency. Operation Enduring Freedom was the Bush 
administration’s response to the terror attacks on the United States, this operation had a 
global objective (2005, 291). After the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and with the 
continued hunt for global al-Qaeda members, President Bush made clear his next phase 
for his War on Terror with the “axis of evil” State of the Union Address of January 29, 
2002. Subsequently, the Bush doctrine claimed a preemptive strike policy for the United 
States. This policy led the way for President Bush to invade Iraq and depose Saddam 
Hussein. President Bush’s proclaimed goals are to democratize the Arab world and 
“create a balance of power that favors human freedom (2005, 291, 313).” 
 Melanson’s outlines major United States foreign policy issues that have faced 
presidential administrations from the end of the Vietnam War to the present. His work is 
vital for it gives a detailed analysis of the global influences on United States foreign 
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policy, and the shifting policy responses from each United States president to each crisis. 
Melanson provides a strong argument for the effect the Cold War containment policy 
created for defining post-Cold War United States foreign policies. 
Fawaz A. Gerges in his book America and Political Islam researches how 
presidential administrations from Carter through Clinton developed foreign policy 
towards Islamic countries. A theme running throughout Gerges’ work is found in the 
subtitle Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests?. Gerges uses speeches, and documents in 
his book to allow the policy makers to speak with their own words, thus allowing for his 
findings to be placed in an historical context, and to analyze how policy shifts over time.  
 Gerges begins the book by looking at different ways the United States approaches 
foreign policy in the Middle East. Questions of security become a central focus in the 
United States foreign policy debate. The United States has many interests in the stability, 
and protection of the Middle East, thus making this issue vital in understanding United 
States foreign policy toward Islam. Gerges lists key United States foreign policy concerns 
in the Middle East: Arab-Israeli conflict, “vulnerability of access to Persian Gulf oil, the 
vulnerability of pro-U.S. Middle Eastern regimes to an Islamist assault, the collapse of 
Soviet Communism, the prorogation of terrorism, and potential proliferation of nuclear 
weapons (Gerges 1999, 11).” The United States during the late 1980’s foreign interests 
shifted from the Cold War to “the intensification of Islamic activism in the Middle East 
and North Africa (1999, 13).”  
 1981 saw the inauguration of Ronald Reagan. President Reagan’s administration 
would confront many critical United States foreign policy events in the Middle East such 
as: the end of the Iranian hostage crisis, Iran-Iraq War, and the bombing of the Marine 
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barracks in Beirut. However, the Middle East was not the fundamental United States 
foreign policy concern. President Reagan devoted his administration towards “the real 
enemy (1999, 70)” communism and the Soviet Union. President Reagan’s foreign policy 
of containment led him to espouse the Reagan Doctrine. This doctrine supported any 
nation, group, or faction resisting communism. “He often reiterated his support for the 
Islamically oriented mujaheden “freedom fighters” because they resisted the Soviets 
(1999, 71).” The containment policy of the Cold War constrained Reagan’s foreign 
policy, allowing for an acceptance of a policy that reinforced “militantly Islamic elements 
(1999, 71)” in the Middle East.     
 Immediately after President George H.W. Bush took office in 1989 questions over 
political Islam were being debated among United States foreign policy makers (1999, 
73). During the Reagan presidency concerns over the Middle East consisted of the Soviet 
Union and Iran. Iran at the time “was the only theocracy in the region (1999, 74).” The 
Islamic movement had been spreading during the 1980’s; the compatibility of Islam was 
being discussed at the end of the Cold War with questions regarding democratization now 
that the United States was the world’s sole superpower (1999, 74).  
 Gerges focuses attention to the Algerian election crisis that escalated in 1991. 
During this crisis Bush’s administration espoused a new United States foreign policy 
toward Islam, the Meridian address was “the first thorough statement given by any U.S. 
administration on the Islamist question (1999, 78).” The Meridian address recognized the 
United States and the Middle East have created policies around “two major pillars – 
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and access to Persian Gulf oil…. The end of the 
Cold War…necessitated the addition of a third pillar to United States foreign policy: a 
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core of fundamental values – such as support of human rights, pluralism, broad popular 
participation in government, and rejection of extremism, oppression, and terrorism (1999, 
80-81).” The Meridian address established a framework that the United States could base 
its policies, there was never a subsequent policy shift after the address towards the 
Middle East. The importance of the Meridian address is seen when President Clinton 
retains Edward Djerejian in his new administration. He was “the main architect of Bush’s 
Islam policy (1999, 85).”  
 Throughout Gerges’ work he outlines political developments in the Middle East 
and how the United States responded to each situation. In his conclusion Gerges does not 
see any real foreign policy shift from the Cold War to the post-Cold War. His claim 
stems from the fact that the United States as the world’s sole superpower “is still 
preoccupied with stability and security and economic relationships, rather than with 
issues of democracy and human rights (1999, 229).” 
 Warren I. Cohen in his book America’s Failing Empire, begins his work by 
giving an historical review of significant events in United States foreign policy during the 
Cold War. Cohen reveals a strong association with containment policy, and a deep 
mistrust of the Soviet Union among the United States foreign policy makers during the 
Cold War. The containment policy and mistrust of the Soviet Union led the United States 
foreign policy leaders to support regimes based around the fact they did not support 
communism. However, in the Middle East during the end of the Reagan administration 
the United States attempted a dual containment. This dual containment focused around 
the Soviet Union and Iran. Since the Iranian revolution the United States has been 
harassing Iran. The United States did not want Iran’s government upsetting the delicate 
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balance in the Middle East with its theocratic governance. During the Iran-Iraq War the 
Reagan administration as part of its dual containment policy “provided Iraq with export 
credits, covert military assistance, and intelligence (Cohen 2005, 22).” The United States 
foreign policy makers were more afraid of “Iran’s Islamic Fundamentalism and intense 
anti-United Statesism than of Saddam’s secular megalomania (2005, 22).”     
 In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s the world witnessed the decline of 
communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. During this time in the post-Iran-
Iraq War, Saddam Hussein threatened Iraq’s neighbors, principally Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia. “On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces swept across the border into Kuwait (2005, 
22).” This move by Saddam Hussein incensed the international community. The United 
States immediately took action against Iraq and froze its assets. The United States and the 
Soviet Union issued a joint statement denouncing Saddam Hussein and encouraged the 
international community to stop military supplies to Iraq (2005, 22-23).  
 During the George H.W. Bush administration the United States foreign policy 
leaders began to formulate foreign policy that did not have to corroborate with 
containment policy. The Bush administration formulated the ‘new world order’ to guide 
United States foreign policy. This new policy was going to create global conditions in 
which United States values would thrive (2005, 56). Cohen claims the George H.W. 
Bush’s presidency caused foreign policy issues to become seemingly obsolete, with the 
exception of trade-issues (2005, 57). President Bill Clinton entered the White House in 
January 1993, not concerned with the Cold War, but rather getting the United States back 
on track economically. The United States was in Somalia on a humanitarian mission. The 
Clinton administration continued George H.W. Bush’s initiative to assist the United 
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Nations in the multilateral humanitarian effort in the failed-state. In the aftermath of the 
Somalia disaster PDD-25 was ordered by President Clinton, the directive outlined the 
policy for the United States and its relationship with the United Nations.  
 In 1994 the power within the United States Congress shifted to the Republican 
Party. The Republicans wanted the Clinton administration to place tougher policies on 
Iran and Iraq. A “dual containment” was created in order to keep each rogue nation in 
check (2005, 95). Middle Eastern countries were not pleased with the sanctions being 
placed upon their neighbors; they too were beginning to feel the effect of the policies. 
Clinton’s foreign policy against Saddam in the mid-1990’s consisted of the Iraqi 
Liberation Act, Operation Desert Fox, and an occasional tomahawk missile (2005, 96-
97). 
 Cohen reveals in his book the rising threat of terrorism. Terrorism had struck 
during the 1980’s but had become an increasingly effective tool during the 1990’s. The 
United States was no longer safe by simply staying at home. Cohen did recognize that 
some terrorist attacks in the United States had been committed by United States citizens, 
but in large part the majority of terrorist attacks on the United States had been by non-
state extremists predominately from the Middle East. After George W. Bush entered the 
White House, and the events of September 11, 2001 transpired United States foreign 
policy was changed ad infinitum. 
 In conducting the War on Terror, beginning in Afghanistan against the Taliban 
and al Qaeda the United States had global support for its mission, but the Bush 
administration did not want a large coalition, it “wanted no interference with the 
implementation of the plan (2005, 133).” After chasing the Taliban out of power, the 
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Bush administration set its new foreign policy objectives against an “axis of evil.” The 
containment strategies of the Cold War were no longer useful policies towards North 
Korea, Iran, and Iraq. The United States needed to take the offensive and “remake the 
world in America’s image (2005, 135).” 
Literature-Post-Cold War— 
 In the book Eagle Adrift, multiple scholars give their analysis of United States 
foreign policy at the turn of the 21st century. In the essay by Robert J. Lieber titled “Eagle 
Without a Cause: Making Foreign Policy Without the Soviet Threat,” he avers the 
difficulty in making “coherent policy initiatives (Lieber 1997, 4)” without a galvanizing 
threat or crisis. The structure of the international system had fundamentally changed with 
the lack of a Soviet presence. Without an evident foreign threat, domestic factors began 
to control the making of United States foreign policy and a peaceful international system 
was expected with the rise of a uni-polar world (1997, 5). 
 Lieber claims the greatest multilateral mission “to maintain international order 
was the conduct of a war: Operation Desert Storm, authorized by the UN Security 
Council Resolutions and led by the United States (1997, 6).” This point is of great 
importance to the post-Cold War world, it revealed the world now only contained one 
nation that could unite other nations around a military objective or operate unilaterally 
(1997, 6). Additionally, during the Cold War the United States and its allies formed a 
bloc against the Soviet Union. Nations-states were forced to cooperate or potentially 
loose security between them all (1997, 11). The post-Cold War does not have the 
unifying threat of a bi-polar international power structure, leaving the United States as 
sole superpower the only nation-state capable of creating an international coalition. 
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 Lieber’s essay was formulated around realist thought. In his work he quoted 
Kenneth Waltz on several occasions, and views the international system as a self-help 
system. This system is based around power. He concluded that the United States’ foreign 
policy in the post-Cold War world will not be a priority “unless there emerges some clear 
unambiguous threat, or there appears a set of policymakers unusually determined to give 
priority to foreign policy (1997, 20).” 
 Bruce W. Jentleson wrote an essay in the book Eagle Adrift titled “Who, Why, 
What, and How: Debates Over Post-Cold War Military Intervention.” Jentleson began the 
essay claiming “two empirical facts” the post-Cold War has led to approximately 90 
armed conflicts by 1995, and United States “forces have been actively deployed more 
times to more places thus far in the 1990s than any comparable length of time during the 
Cold War (Jentleson 1997, 39-40).” In the post-Cold War the United States espoused a 
multilateral position in the world, while maintaining the right to act unilaterally if needed. 
Its interests around the globe have heightened in the post-Cold War, its interests have 
shifted to consist of not only national defense and democratization, but also defending 
human rights, and assisting marginalized citizens of the world. Jentleson wants to answer 
four questions with his essay. First, who should have the right to determine the use of 
United States military force in the post-Cold War? Second, why is it in the United States’ 
interest to consider military action? Third, what is the best strategy for the military to use 
in the post-Cold War world? Finally, how should intervention be spread-out across the 
powers of the world, from the United States, United Nations and other regional 
organizations (1997, 40-41)? 
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 In the post-Cold War who should determine if the United States military is used? 
The president has the authority to make war, Congress the authority to declare war and 
finance a war, and United States citizens can cast their vote in elections. In the early years 
of the post-Cold War the president, and Congress allowed public opinion polls to affect 
its missions abroad. This caused an international concern over the United States being 
committed to its objectives, and policies. Additionally, it showed that foreign policy was 
of less concern to the United States public than domestic issues.  
 Why should the United States consider military action? The United States should 
consider military action to protect its national interests, and stand-up for its foreign 
policy. However, in the post-Cold War there is a lacking foreign policy consensus that 
creates caveats in the course of action pursued by members of the executive and 
legislative branch. There is also a danger in creating criteria for using military action. 
This could be used to the advantage of the enemy, by allowing them to push the United 
States knowing there would be no reprisal. 
What is the best strategy for the military to use in the post-Cold War world? Now 
that the United States is the world’s sole superpower, should United Nations play a 
greater role in military and diplomatic efforts (1997, 54)? In a post-Cold War world the 
United Nations represents the majority of the collective view of the international 
community. Or should the United States follow the model set in the Persian Gulf War 
where it created a coalition and sought permission for military action through the United 
Nations Security Council. The force assembled against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was like 
one the world had never seen. The United States, the Soviet Union, Europe, and Arab 
nations all standing together in opposition to an aggressor, this was proven a powerful 
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force (1997, 54-55). The United States in the post-Cold War has to stand strong and 
committed. Often the United Nations and the international community are hesitant to get 
involved, but the United States risks its credibility by getting involved or over-committed 
in a unilateralist mission (1997, 61). 
How should intervention be spread-out across the powers of the world, from the 
United States, United Nations and other regional organizations (1997, 40-41)? Jentleson 
believes this to be the toughest question to answer. When the United States is directly 
threatened a unilateralist option is valid. However, when the United States wants to 
operate in an intra-state conflict the United Nations or regional multilateral organizations 
seem to have an equal authority. “The challenging and crucial questions on strategy are 
those that address the structural, procedural, political, operational, and other problems of 
action multilaterally, and do so for the many forms that multilateral action can take 
(1997, 65).” 
The post-Cold War does not create an environment of predictability, or stability. 
The freshness of the uni-polar world is causing growing pains within foreign policy, and 
international community. The structural dimensions of foreign policy making have 
changed in the post-Cold War (1997, 65). Jentleson tries to answer the question of who, 
why, what, and how the United States military should be used in the post-Cold War. This 
question is imperative for the study of United States foreign policy. Jentleson does not 
reach any definitive conclusions with his argument, other than to say it is a tough 
question, with mixed results.   
 In American Foreign Policy, authored by Daniel S. Papp, Loch K. Johnson, and 
John E. Endicott, they outline the historical and structural framework that is United States 
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foreign policy. The authors devote a chapter in their book to the post-Cold War. This 
chapter outlines the struggles from George H.W. Bush through George W. Bush.    
 When George H.W. Bush was campaigning for President of the United States he 
ran on the platform that he was going to follow President Reagan’s foreign policies. 
However, when President Bush took office in January 1989 “the world had changed so 
much that U.S. foreign policy had to be revised (Papp, Johnson, and Endicott 2005, 
227).” President George H.W. Bush began to worry about Saddam Hussein threats to 
expand Iraq, which could lead to him controlling the world oil prices. The United States 
first reacted by sending troops into the region. Then a “political-military alliance of over 
30 states (2005, 197)” was created to oppose Saddam’s attack on Kuwaiti sovereignty. 
Additionally, the United States used the United Nations to impose economic sanctions on 
Iraq. This was not enough to force Saddam Hussein’s troops out of Kuwait. The Persian 
Gulf War only lasted 100 hours, but Saddam Hussein remained in power but severely 
weakened. George H.W. Bush did not want to invade Baghdad and remove Saddam 
Hussein from power due to the fragile nature of the region, the coalition, and the belief in 
a potential internal uprising against Saddam Hussein (2005, 198). 
 President Clinton entered the White House dealing with the aftermath of the 
Persian Gulf War, and several international crises left unsettled by President Bush. The 
Clinton administration believed in a policy of enlargement. This meant “the United States 
promoted democracy, open markets, and other Western political, economic and social 
values (2005, 204).” This was thought of as another word for democratization. President 
Clinton’s foreign policies focused on strengthening the world’s economy, and the 
domestic economy.  
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 Terrorist began to attack with frequency during the Clinton presidency. Terrorism 
was not new but “international terrorist networks (2005, 216)” were just beginning to 
make a name for themselves, most notably al Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden. The 
problem of international terrorism would be a problem that the Clinton administration 
handed to President George W. Bush and his administration. 
     In the first nine months of the George W. Bush presidency he had avoided most 
foreign policy issues regarding the Middle East. On September 11, 2001 George W. 
Bush’s foreign policy would not overlook the Middle East any longer. The United States 
after the attacks had three foreign policy priorities: defend the homeland, execute war on 
terrorism, prevent terrorist from gaining weapons of mass destruction (2005, 221). As the 
war in Afghanistan began to shift towards constructing a nation, the war against the axis 
of evil began. The majority of the world did not support George W. Bush’s preemptive 
policy for war against Iran, North Korea, Iraq, or any aggressor that harbored or 
supported terrorist. The Bush administration’s approach toward prosecuting the war 
began to isolate it from the coalition on the war on terror. Papp, Johnson, and Endicott 
concluded by claiming that President Bush’s foreign policies in Iraq have been based 
around realist policies, and unilateralism (2005, 228).    
 Fraser Cameron in his book US Foreign Policy After The Cold War perceives 
United States foreign policy not having any unified direction until the September 11, 
2001 attacks. Since 1990, the United States was “the only nation on earth able to project 
power in every part of the world…and it has been involved in resolving conflicts on 
every continent (Cameron 2005, xvi).” The United States at the beginning of the post-
Cold War used ambiguous language and rhetoric to describe its new position in the uni-
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polar world. This language included “new world order,” global leadership, and “it is our 
opportunity – to lead (2005, 16).” Creating a United States foreign policy in the post-
Cold War, while foreign policy issues where no longer what public opinion polls deemed 
important, and the declining economy forced the George H.W. Bush administration to 
take a selective approach to its foreign policy formulation. However, at the end of the 
George H.W. Bush presidency he agreed to send United States troops to Somalia on a 
United Nations humanitarian mission. This mission had not been resolved upon Bill 
Clinton’s arrival in the White House. George H.W. Bush “presented a poisoned chalice 
(2005, 18)” to President Clinton, the Somalia calamity would have major ramifications 
on the Clinton Presidency, United States foreign policy, and the United States’ 
relationship with the United Nations.   
 President Clinton in his inaugural address spoke on creating a new foreign policy 
“for a world that had fundamentally changed.”3 Despite facing foreign policy problems 
leftover from the Bush administration (Iraq, Haiti, Somalia, and the Balkans), President 
Clinton focused the majority of his foreign policy on creating, and opening new markets. 
Clinton’s goal was to increase the economic breadth of foreign policy.  
 When George W. Bush entered the White House in January 2001, he like Clinton 
had little foreign policy experience. In the first nine months of George W. Bush’s 
presidency the administration had done little in the way of creating a foreign policy. 
There were critics that suggested the only thing that President Bush had accomplished 
was to undo everything President Clinton had done in the past eight years (2005, 25). 
Thus, George W. Bush’s administration had begun to isolate itself from the international 
                                                 
3 President Bill Clinton, “Presidential Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C.” January 1993. In Fraser 
Cameron. US Foreign Policy After The Cold War, 2nd ed. NY: Routledge Publishing. 
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community. On September 11, 2001 the George W. Bush presidency was defined. In 
order to conduct the war on terrorism, and to fight the “axis of evil,” George W. Bush 
“accepted the neocon thesis that United States military power could resolve most foreign 
policy problems. The Iraq war was to demonstrate both the potency and the impotency of 
US military power (2005, 33).”   
 Fraser Cameron’s book on United States foreign policy in the post-Cold War 
provides an analysis of each administration of the post-Cold War. However, the majority 
of his work focused on George W. Bush presidency and the implications that 
administration has had on the international political scene. He starts to show trepidation 
in the George W. Bush administration, and its handling of foreign policy after the Iraq 
War.   
 Jon Kraus begins his essay claiming that George W. Bush’s foreign policy 
strategy is contradictory (Kraus, McMahon, Rankin 2004, 167). When the George W. 
Bush wanted to conduct the war on terror against the Taliban and al Qaeda, his 
administration formulated a global coalition. After the removal of the Taliban from 
power, the administration switched the focus to its “axis of evil” initiatives. The first 
country the administration targeted was Iraq. This move “divided severely the political 
coalition of support so important to the “war on terror” (2004, 167).” Kraus believes that 
the Bush administration is determined to show America’s uni-polar world dominance, 
and that the United States has the will and capability to act unilaterally.  
 President Bush spoke at the United States Military Academy at West Point about 
the shortcomings of containment and deterrence against stateless terrorists. Thus, the 
United States reserves the right to use preemptive military action in order to avoid an 
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attack on the United States or its citizens. The United States rationalizes its policy by 
claiming that terrorists, or nations of evil do not follow rules, consequently “the United 
States is not obliged to respect their sovereignty and can launch preemptive strikes (2004, 
175).” 
 Kraus deems that the United States now needs to start rebuilding some of its 
global relationships. The United States unilateralist’s attitude is viewed as counter-
productive, now that the job of rebuilding nations, and regions has begun. Kraus still 
believes that George W. Bush can have a successful administration “if Bush heeds the 
less arrogant, more multilateral voices in government, the United States can recover the 
support of its allies (2004, 192).” 
Summary— 
 The literature shows a strong correlation between the United States’ Cold War 
foreign policy of containment, and the United States’ post-Cold War foreign policy shift 
towards the Middle East in the form of greater use of its military to achieve foreign 
policy goals. When the Cold War ended, and containment was no longer a vital foreign 
policy concern the United States foreign policy makers were ill prepared to handle the 
emergence of a uni-polar world. The lack of a unified foreign policy direction in the post-
Cold War created conditions for shifts in United States foreign policy towards the Middle 
East. The foreign policy shifts began to occur as the international power structure moved 
from a bi-polar to a uni-polar power structure. Scholars writing about the Cold War 
discuss the impact the bi-polar system had on the making of United States foreign policy 
towards the Middle East. However, the post-Cold War writers only mention to shift in the 
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power structure during the George H.W. Bush presidency, not mentioning the effects of a 
uni-polar world after its initial inception.  
  During the latter stages of the Cold War terrorism was on the rise in the Middle 
East. Weapons of mass destruction during the Cold War were ostensibly a concern for 
nation-states. However, weapons of mass destruction became a common concern within 
the literature in regards to the Middle East and United States foreign policy in the post-
Cold War. Issues surrounding weapons of mass destruction in the post-Cold War have 
ranged from protecting the former-Soviet Union’s vast quantity of nuclear weapons from 
the wrong people, groups, terrorists and rogue states, and supporting nuclear non-
proliferation. The prevention of terrorist and or rogue states from obtaining weapons of 
mass destruction has brought about foreign policy initiatives to combat these issues with 
military force.      
 Israel and the United States’ relationship still affect foreign policies in the Middle 
East region. The Arab-Israeli peace process is an issue every post-Cold War president has 
attempted to resolve. The United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East in regards to 
Israel has shifted. In the Cold War the Soviet Union supported some Arab resistance 
toward Israel. Thus the United States supported and protected Israel as a way to contain 
the Soviet Union’s influence in the Middle East. In the post-Cold War the United States 
attempts to achieve peace in the Middle East by forcefully installing freedom via 
democracy, instead of achieving this through diplomacy, self-determination and pro-
democracy grassroots Middle East social movements.  
 Iraq and Iran since the end of the Cold War have been problems in United States 
foreign policy. Both nations have experienced economic sanctions, and are targets of the 
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“axis of evil” plan that George W. Bush espoused. During the Iraq War between the 
United States and Iraq, the United States used its new preemptive strike policy, in order 
to prevent from being threatened by Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. 
Where does this literature lead us? — 
 With the collapse of the bi-polar world, there has been an increase in the number 
of armed conflicts around the world. The United States has increasingly been deployed to 
areas of regional and local conflict. The United States has foreign policy interests in the 
Middle East’s oil, the Arab-Israeli peace, the democratization of the globe, the opening of 
foreign markets, protecting the United States and its citizens from weapons of mass 
destruction, a doctrine of preemptive warfare, and the United States wanting to maintain 
its power position in the world. This literature does not address thoroughly the impact the 
change in the international power structure from a bi-polar to a uni-polar world had on 
United States foreign policy in the Middle East. The bi-polar international power 
structure had a tremendous impact on the execution of United States foreign policy in the 
Middle East. The bi-polar international power structure forced the United States to use 
peripheral methods to achieve foreign policy goals. The United States’ bi-polar world 
foreign policy strategy in the Middle East consisted of containment policy, which aimed 
at preventing war at all cost, and presidential doctrines that deterred the Soviet Union’s 
involvement in the Middle East, or supported groups within the region that did not 
support communism. These foreign policy initiatives were fundamental in the 
implementation of United States foreign policy in the bi-polar world. Why has there not 
been a focus on the uni-polar international power structure’s impact on the execution of 
United States foreign policy in the Middle East? I hypothesize that the United States 
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foreign policy shifts in the Middle East occurred due to a change in the distribution of 
political power within the interstate system. This change had the following result: the 
United States is no longer constrained by a bi-polar distribution of power that 
characterized the Cold War period. The uni-polar international power structure allows the 
United States to directly use its military to achieve foreign policy objectives within the 
Middle East. 
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—Chapter 3— 
The Ronald Reagan Administration  
—The Collapse of the Bi-Polar World— 
 
 
The last United States president during the Cold War was Ronald Reagan. His 
administration was the last to be effected by the constraints of the bi-polar international 
power structure. In this chapter I analyze the Reagan administration’s foreign policy 
towards the Middle East and how it was affected by the Cold War’s bi-polar power 
international power structure. Once I establish how the United States’ foreign policy was 
affected by the bi-polar world at the end of the Cold War, in the subsequent chapters 4,5, 
and 6, I analyze the shift in United States foreign policy in the post-Cold War’s uni-polar 
international power structure. 
The Ronald Reagan Administration 1981-1989— 
President Carter “had tried to focus on the central Israeli-Palestinian impasse, the 
Reagan administration preferred to fit the Middle East into a much broader global 
framework of American foreign policy (Fraser 1989, 159).” At the beginning of the 
Reagan administration the Middle East was an unstable tinderbox of regionalized and 
local activity, which could potentially spread and effect broader parts of the Middle East. 
The Soviet Union was fighting resistance forces in Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq War was 
ongoing, Lebanon faced continued civil discontent, and Israel was still an explosive issue 
in the Middle East (Lenczowski 1990, 212). Reagan’s foreign policymakers claimed the 
Soviet Union was the source of regional instability in the Middle East, thus the United 
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States was willing to protect its national interests in the Middle East with the threat of 
military force; this policy caused third-world conflicts to result into a United States-
Soviet Union battle for power and influence (Dallin and Lapidus 1987, 223-224). 
Additionally, during the Reagan administration terrorism became a popular tool used by 
groups within the Middle East. These organizations and groups saw the success of the 
Iranian hostage crisis and believed terrorism to be an effective tool versus a more 
powerful adversary. Despite the potential for undesirable balance of power shifts within 
the Middle East stemming from these vulnerable foreign policy situations, the United 
States’ real enemy and threat according to President Reagan was the Soviet Union.  
Lebanon— 
 President Reagan viewed Israel as a “strategic asset and important ally in the 
Middle East (Miglietta 2002, 143).” Thus, the United States foreign policy response 
toward the crises in Lebanon during the Reagan administration had broad regional 
implications. Israel and the Palestinians in Lebanon were honoring a cease-fire when “on 
June 6, 1982, Israel launched a major invasion of Lebanon…called “Operation Peace for 
Galilee” (Lenczowski 1990, 217).” Israel’s wanted to knockout the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon. Unfortunately, in order to achieve 
this objective Israel was going to have to invade Lebanon, something the international 
community and the United States would not approve. The Reagan administration not 
wanting to be unsupportive of Israel’s security, gave only a placid diplomatic warning to 
the Israeli offensive plan. “The United States would never tell Israel not to defend herself 
from attack, but any action she took must be in response to an internationally recognized 
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provocation, and the response must be proportionate to that provocation (Haig 1984, 169-
170).” 
 In August 1982 peace talks were ongoing between Israel, Lebanon, Syria and the 
PLO.  Eventually, peace meant the Lebanese would regain sovereignty over Lebanon, 
and various members of the PLO would leave Lebanon. “If that happened, it would clear 
the way for the Israeli Defense Force, and even the Syrians and Iranians, to withdraw as 
well (Wills 2003, 50).” The PLO began leaving Lebanon on August 21 while a 
multinational peacekeeping force was monitoring the exodus, including United States 
Marines of the Sixth Fleet (Lenczowski 1990, 221). The multinational peacekeeping 
force oversaw the withdrawal of the PLO from Lebanon to Arab-nations in the Middle 
East and Africa. The United States military forces left after seventeen days, nearly two 
weeks ahead of what was originally planned (Fraser 1989, 174). The Italians, and French 
believed that the United States removed troops prematurely.  
 Bashir Gemayel was elected by the Lebanese parliament as Lebanon’s new 
president, but on September 14 he was assassinated (1989, 175, 178). The assassination 
encouraged Israeli military leaders to advance in Beirut to help thwart any anarchy. 
Subsequently, what happened was the assassinated president’s Phalange party went to the 
Sabra and Shatila camps massacring over 800 Palestinian men, women, and children 
(Lenczowski 1990, 222). This massacre destabilized the region once again and brought 
United States military forces back to Lebanon. The multinational peacekeeping force’s 
mission was to provide assistance in rebuilding the Lebanese army, and maintain peace 
and order so that the Lebanese government could gain effective control over Lebanon. 
However, the multinational peacekeeping force soon became targets for terrorist. On 
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October 23, 1983, the United States Marine Corps headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon was 
attacked by a suicide car-bomber. “In justifying American presence President Reagan 
stated soon afterward that the United States has “vital interests” in Lebanon and the 
American troops were there to prevent the Middle East from becoming “incorporated into 
the Soviet bloc (1990, 224).”4  
Reagan Doctrine— 
 The Soviet Union invaded its southern neighbor Afghanistan in December 1979. 
This action prompted President Carter to issue a presidential doctrine known as the Carter 
Doctrine. The Carter Doctrine claimed that the Persian Gulf region was vital to the 
national interest of the United States and that any attempt to control this region would be 
a threat to the United States national interests, and any aggressor potentially would be 
met with military force. The Soviet Union continued to occupy Afghanistan during the 
1980’s. United States foreign policy was under the constraints of the bi-polar world to 
maintain a balance of power in the Middle East and to prevent the Soviet Union from 
gaining access to the Middle East’s oil and the warm water ports of the Persian Gulf, thus 
President Reagan issued the Reagan Doctrine. The Reagan Doctrine supported who 
President Reagan referred to as “freedom fighters,” Afghanistan’s resistance forces the 
Mujaheden. The doctrine supported the “freedom fighters” providing “moral and material 
assistance” to allow the “freedom fighters” the Mujaheden not just the ability to “fight 
and die for freedom but to fight and win freedom—to win freedom in Afghanistan.”5 The 
                                                 
4 President Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation on Lebanon and Grenada,” (October 27, 1983), In The 
Middle East Journal 38, no.2 (Spring 1984), 286. Quoted In George Lenczowski. 1990. American 
Presidents and the Middle East. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.  
5 President Ronald Reagan, “State of the Union Address,” (February 4, 1986):  
from < http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/major.html >. 
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Reagan Doctrine was a part of the United States’ foreign policy of containment, but it 
was an offensive strategy against the Soviet Union’s advances within strategic third 
world countries (Spanier and Hook 1995, 206-207). Unlike previous doctrines during the 
Cold War, the Reagan Doctrine wanted to drain the Soviet Union’s resources by 
providing peripheral support to resistance fighters. The doctrine revealed the constraints 
on United States foreign policy in the bi-polar world by espousing the support of a 
repressive third party to take low-scale aggressive action against the antagonist 
superpower, thus preventing the United States from having to take direct action against 
the Soviet Union.  
   “Assistance to the Afghan rebels was one of the largest operations of this kind 
mounted by the U.S. government (Lenczowski 1990, 228).” The Reagan administration 
believed its foreign policy had to be tough against the Soviet Union thus; it supported the 
“freedom fighters” cause despite their despotic history. This was the nature of the bi-
polar international world power structure; the United States supported a repressive 
regime in order to maintain a balance of power against the antagonist superpower. The 
United State feared the Soviet Union’s presence in the Middle East. When the Soviet 
Union began discussing withdrawing troops from Afghanistan the United States stood 
firm, to prevent the Soviet Union from establishing a puppet regime sympathetic to the 
Soviet Union’s interests. President Reagan said, “We support the Mujahidin. There can 
be no settlement unless all Soviet troops are removed and the Afghan people are allowed 
genuine self-determination.”6 The foreign policies of the Reagan administration in 
response to the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan are directly linked to the 
                                                 
6 President Ronald Reagan, “State of the Union Address,” (January 25, 1988):  
from < http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/major.html >. 
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containment of communism and the effect of the bi-polar world power structure. The bi-
polar world’s affect on United States foreign policy in the Middle East caused the two 
world superpowers to “heavily militarize third world states (Tilly 1991, 40)” in the name 
of balancing power, and promoting its foreign policies. By supporting the ‘freedom 
fighters” the Reagan administration was attempting to maintain a balance of power, and 
prevent the Soviet Union’s expansion and involvement in the Middle East, disregarding 
the fact that it was arming the “most “militant Islamic element” within the mujaheden 
alliance, particularly the Party of Islam (Gerges 1999, 71).”7 The bi-polar world forced 
the Reagan administration to support the Mujaheden, the enemy was the Soviet Union not 
Islamism (1999, 70). 
Iran-Iraq War— 
 The Iran-Iraq War jeopardized the balance of power in the Middle East, 
threatened oil supplies, and the Persian Gulf states economies. Early in the war Iran was 
able to destroy Iraq’s oil industry based in the Persian Gulf, thus forcing Iraq to rely on 
“land-based pipelines through neighboring territories (Lenczowski 1990, 244).” 
Concurrently, Iraq sabotaged Iranian oil supplies in the Persian Gulf creating a 
tremendous economic drain to Iran’s war effort. In 1986-7 Iran advanced into Iraq and 
began taking audacious steps in preventing third parties from assisting Iraq. Due to the 
advance of the Iranian army Kuwait was threatened. Kuwait began calling for outside 
assistance to protect its oil resources. If Iran was capable of winning the Iran-Iraq War 
and gain control over Kuwait, the United States national interests would be in peril from 
                                                 
7 Richard W. Cottam, “U.S. and Soviet Responses to Islamic Political Militancy,” In Neither East nor West, 
pp. 279-280, quoted in Fawaz A. Gerges. 1999. America and Political Islam. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
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Iran’s control of vast amounts of the world’s oil supply (Payne 1991, 104). On December 
10, 1986, Kuwait “asked the United States to put eleven of its tankers under American 
registry, in the hope that the U.S. Navy would escort and protect them through the Gulf 
waters. Implied in Kuwait’s initiative was the idea that if the United States refused, 
Kuwait would turn to the Soviet Union to seek protection,” thus on March 7, 1987, the 
United States put the eleven Kuwaiti tankers under the protection of the American flag 
(Lenczowski 1990, 245-6). 
 The Soviet Union and the United States shared common interests in the Middle 
East and the Iran-Iraq War provided a stage for these interests to play themselves out. 
Kuwait’s tactic for gaining protection against the Iranians was to negotiate with the two 
world superpowers. The bi-polar world put the United States and the Soviet Union in a 
head-to-head confrontation to provide assistance the distressed third world country. This 
power rivalry caused great concern in the Reagan administration and influenced foreign 
policy decision-making. The Soviet Union had a “longstanding objective of gaining 
access to a warm water port (Payne 1991, 118),” thus the United States had to provide 
protection or it would be inviting the Soviet Union into the Middle East by its inability to 
perform duties of a superpower. President Reagan stated in a speech on June 15, 1987:  
“Most recently there's been some controversy about 11 new U.S. flag 
vessels that've been added to our merchant fleet. Let there be no 
misunderstanding: We will accept our responsibility for these vessels in 
the face of threats by Iran or anyone else. If we fail to do so simply 
because these ships previously flew the flag of another country, Kuwait, 
we would abdicate our role as a naval power, and we would open 
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opportunities for the Soviets to move into this chokepoint of the free 
world's oil flow. In a word: If we don't do the job, the Soviets will. And 
that will jeopardize our own national security as well as our allies.”8 
Summary—  
 The Reagan administration viewed the Soviet Union with great mistrust. The 
Reagan Doctrine allowed the United States to halt the Soviet Union’s expansion in 
Afghanistan, by providing assistance to “freedom fighters.” The bi-polar international 
power structure that defined the Cold War unambiguously shaped United States foreign 
policy in the Middle East. The United States had to account for the Soviet Union before 
implementing any policy within the region. Alliances, allies, arms deals, and financial 
assistance with Middle Eastern nations all considered the reaction, and response of the 
Soviet Union. The United States’ containment policy was centered on limiting Soviet 
expansion and influence within the Middle East, thus affecting the United States’ foreign 
policies towards the Middle East. The Reagan administration’s Middle East foreign 
policies focused on the Soviet Union first, then protecting economic interests, 
maintaining national security interests, and providing military assistance as a means of 
insuring the success of its foreign policy goals. The Cold War’s bi-polar power structure 
made United States foreign policy decisions pragmatic in order to contain communism, 
protect Israel, and keep vital oil supplies open for the United States and its allies in a 
world of increasing economic interdependence. 
                                                 
8 President Ronald Reagan, “An Address to the Nation on Arms Reduction & the Venice Summit,” (June 
15, 1987):  from < http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/major.html >.  
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—Chapter 4— 
The George H.W. Bush Administration 
—A New World Order— 
 
 
 In chapter 3, I discussed how the world’s bi-polar power structured shaped United 
States foreign policy in the Middle East at the end of the Cold War. The United States 
was cautious to take direct military action in the region, for fear of a communist response. 
The foreign policy objectives of the United States during the Cold War in the Middle 
East had focused on preventing the Soviet Union’s influence in the Middle East, 
protecting Israel, and protecting oil reserves. During the Reagan administration the 
United States achieved its foreign policy goals via supporting peripheral groups to disrupt 
the Soviets attempt to gain a foothold in the Middle East region, providing peacekeeping 
troops in a multinational mission in Lebanon, and by providing temporary protection of 
Kuwaiti vessels during the Iran-Iraq War by adding them to the United States merchant 
fleet. The bi-polar world influenced the Reagan administration’s response to the Middle 
East during the Cold War. President Reagan was the last United States president to be 
involved with major Cold War foreign policies. Containment policy was the United 
States’ major foreign policy strategy since the Truman administration. It became obsolete 
during George H.W. Bush’s term in office. When George H.W. Bush took office in 1989 
the Cold War was ending, and the bi-polar world power structure was collapsing. 
However, in 1989 the Bush administration viewed the Soviet Union as a threat to the 
Middle East. This is seen in National Security Directive 26. “The United States should 
  53
continue to engage the Soviets in a dialogue on regional issues, doing what we can to 
discourage arms sales and meddling in Iran and elsewhere in the region.”9   
In this chapter, I outline the shift in Unites States foreign policy in the Middle 
East, as the United States became the world’s sole superpower. The uni-polar world 
caused United States foreign policy makers to make an unexpected about-face; Cold War 
foreign policies were no longer practical. Additionally, in this chapter, I present George 
H.W. Bush’s steps towards constructing new United States foreign policy goals in the 
uni-polar world in the Middle East. In the subsequent chapters 5, and 6, I study the 
development of foreign policy by President Clinton and George W. Bush in the uni-polar 
world in the Middle East.  
The George H.W. Bush Administration 1989-1993— 
 In 1989 when George H.W. Bush became President of the United States the 
world’s power structure was changing. Eastern Europe had been under the Soviet 
Union’s control since the end of World War II, was now witnessing anti-communist 
movements. The Soviet Union’s leader Mikhail Gorbachev made drastic changes to the 
foreign policies of the Soviet Union, thus easing tensions between the two superpowers, 
causing political changes across Eastern Europe. “By the end of 1989, no communist 
government except Yugoslavia’s remained in Eastern Europe (Papp, Johnson, and 
Endicott 2005, 195).” Simultaneously, the Soviet Union withdrew troops from 
Afghanistan. 1989 saw peaceful political power change in Eastern Europe, given hope 
that future conflicts will be solved diplomatically and not by militaries (2005, 197). As 
tensions were thawing in the Cold War, the Middle East became the hotspot for 
                                                 
9 President George H.W. Bush, “National Security Directive: U.S. Policy Towards the Persian Gulf, NSD 
26,” (October 2, 1989): from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd26.pdf>. 
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international conflict and was a catalyst for ushering in the uni-polar world. “As the 
overlay of Cold War conflict has been removed, a significant external restraint on 
regional conflicts…has disappeared…. This ‘regionalization’ of international security 
represents an important distinguishing feature of the post-Cold War world military and 
security order (Held et al 1999, 101).” Consequently, President George H.W. Bush 
devised a “new world order,” responded to Saddam Hussein’s aggression in the Middle 
East, and espoused the democratization of the Middle East in order to more sufficiently 
provided peace, and security to the Middle East. 
The New World Order— 
 President George H.W. Bush spoke before a joint session of Congress on 
September 11, 1990, and began laying out guidelines for America’s post-Cold War 
foreign policy. He declared there was a “New World Order” and that the bi-polar world 
power struggles had ended. His new world order promoted global security and stability, 
and it warned that the international community would put down any aggression. The new 
world order took into consideration globalization’s affects on the world. Nation-states 
were now not the only source of significant world power. With the collapse of the bi-
polar world, the uni-polar world allowed for greater influence and significance from non-
state actors, regional, and transnational organizations (Ohaegbulam 1999, 46). 
Globalization caused local matters to have a global affect, thus President George H.W. 
Bush’s new world order created a system that allowed the United States to react and 
resolve international crisis that had local origins. The administration perceived that 
“States in the periphery…operate within a system in which political instability, militarism 
and state expansion remain endemic and in which there is no effective deterrent to war as 
  55
a rational instrument of state policy (Held et al 1999, 101).” Thus, the new world order 
proclaimed by President George H.W. Bush focused on responding to local events such 
as “terrorism, hostage-taking, drug, trafficking, renegade regimes with unpredictable 
rulers intent on dominating critical regions of the world, and nuclear proliferation 
(Ohaegbulam 1999, 47).” The United States’ new status as the world’s sole superpower 
forced President H.W. Bush’s foreign policy makers to apply new methods to achieve 
foreign policy goals. President George H.W. Bush attempted to pursue multilateral 
policies, create a global cooperation, in essence majority rule, instead of the United States 
appearing to act as a global hegemony. Additionally, “there is a gradual shift taking place 
towards cooperative defense or multilateral security arrangements. The desire to avoid 
interstate conflict and the enormous costs, technological requirements and domestic 
burdens of defence are together contributing to the historic strengthening…of multilateral 
and collective defence arrangements as well as international military cooperation and 
coordination (Held et al 1999, 101).”  
The first challenge to President George H.W. Bush’s new world order was 
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. In his September 11, 1990 speech, the President 
outlined the need for the international community to demonstrate determination, defend 
common vital interests, support rule of law, and stand up to aggression; then President 
George H.W. Bush established the United States as the leader of the new world order by 
claiming that “in the pursuit of these goals America will not be intimidated.”10 The new 
world order will be led by the superpower United States, but ideally multinational 
participation gives the new world order its strength. The concept of multilateralism gives 
                                                 
10 President George H.W. Bush, “Address Before Joint Session of Congress,” (September 11, 1990): 
from <http://millercenter.virginia.edu>. 
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the United Nations a greater role in global issues, now that the world is not divided 
among East versus West. “National security, in an anarchic interstate system, can never 
be disentangled entirely from the global systemic conditions. All this suggests that the 
contemporary geopolitical order, far from simply fragmenting, remains beset by problems 
of global strategic interconnectedness (Held et al 1999, 102-103).” Therefore, by 
President George H.W. Bush promoting more integrative trading policies with regions 
around the globe, President George H.W. Bush could preserve peace and stability in the 
uni-polar world through the promotion of democracy and increasing wealth around the 
globe.  
The Persian Gulf War— 
 “The absence of superpower rivalry left a power vacuum that one regional leader, 
Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, attempted to fill (Spanier and Hook 1995, 255).” On August 2, 
1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, thus controlling its rich oil fields, and was a 
potential threat to Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty and massive oil reserves. President George 
H.W. Bush declared in the National Security Directive 45: “U.S. interests in the Persian 
Gulf are vital to national security. The interests include access to oil and security and 
stability of key friendly states in the region. The United States will defend its vital 
interests in the area, through the use of U.S. military force if necessary and appropriate, 
against any power with interests inimical to our own.”11 
After the invasion by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the United Nations sought 
economic sanctions against Iraq. “The United States and its allies built a massive military 
presence in and around Saudi Arabia as the UN passed resolutions condemning Iraq 
                                                 
11 President George H.W. Bush. “National Security Directive: U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion 
of Kuwait, NSD 45,” (August 20, 1990): from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd_45.htm>. 
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(Papp, Johnson, and Endicott 2005, 198).” President Bush wanted to bring about a new 
era in United States foreign policy over the issue of Iraq. The end of the Cold War left the 
United States the world’s lone superpower. In President Bush’s speech on September 11, 
1990, President Bush began constructing the foundation for a new American foreign 
policy for the uni-polar world.  
“We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the 
Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move 
toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times… a 
new world order—can emerge…. This is the vision that I shared with 
President Gorbachev in Helsinki. He and other leaders from Europe, the 
Gulf, and around the world understand that how we manage this crisis 
today could shape the future for generations to come.”12 
With the multinational coalition established the United States led fight in Operation 
Desert Storm that began on January 16, 1991, and when the multinational forces began its 
ground assault to drive the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait the war was over within 100 hours. 
President George H.W. Bush ended the Persian Gulf War after the terms outlined in 
National Security Directive 54 were met. These terms included: withdrawal of Iraqi 
forces from Kuwait; restore Kuwait’s pre-invasion government; protect Americans in the 
region; advance security and stability within the Persian Gulf region.13  
 Throughout the Iraq-Kuwait conflict the United States took a leadership role 
against Iraq’s aggressions. The United States’ foreign policies during the Cold War were 
                                                 
12 President George H.W. Bush, “Address Before Joint Session of Congress,” (September 11, 1990): 
 from < http://millercenter.virginia.edu >. 
13 President George H.W. Bush, “National Security Directive: Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf, 
NSD 54,” (January 15, 1991): from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd_54.htm>. 
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to prevent the spread of communism and Soviet influence,  to maintain the stability of the 
Middle East, protect Israel, and protect the Middle East’s vast oil supplies. With the shift 
in the United States’ power position to sole superpower, it was in its national interest to 
take direct military action to protect the oil supplies, and promote peace and stability 
within the Middle East. If Saddam Hussein’s aggression went unchecked it would have 
left George H.W. Bush’s concept of a ‘New World Order’ in ruins (Cameron 2005, 15), 
and the global economy would be in jeopardy if one nation monopolized a major world 
energy supply. Despite the Bush administration’s efforts to work so intently with the 
United Nations and allies from around the world on a diplomatic end to the Iraq-Kuwait 
crisis, President Bush was very forthright about military action against Iraq. In every 
speech given by President Bush from August 1990 through March of 1991, President 
George H.W. Bush never hesitated about his military option against Iraq. With numerous 
United Nations Security Council resolutions the United States foreign policy actions 
against Iraq were aggressive, since there was no balance-of-power check on direct United 
States military involvement within the region. However, President George H.W. Bush 
made his foreign policy stance very clear that this was a multinational, multilateral 
mission to remove Iraq from Kuwait. Additionally, President Bush emphasized, “this is 
not, as Saddam Hussein would have it, the United States against Iraq. It is Iraq against the 
world.” 14  
 The Persian Gulf War brought the world into the uni-polar international power 
structure led by the sole world superpower the United States. President George H.W. 
Bush’s foreign policies towards the Middle East became increasingly aggressive, and 
                                                 
14 President George H.W. Bush, “Address Before Joint Session of Congress,” (September 11, 1990): from 
< http://millercenter.virginia.edu >. 
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eventually lead the deployment of military methods to resolve conflict, and the 
establishment of United States military bases in the Middle East. The United States had 
“conducted a low-intensity war consisting of economic sanctions, UN inspections for 
weapons of mass destruction, a heavily patrolled no-fly zone in northern and southern 
Iraq, and periodic bombings to degrade the Iraqi military, especially its radar and 
communications divisions…. this “containment” policy had the added virtue of giving the 
United States the excuse and opportunity to maintain a permanent military presence in 
the Persian Gulf (McCormick 2005, 84).”  
The United States’ foreign policy in the bi-polar world threatened the use of 
military force by placing the United States military in the proximity of the Middle East 
ready to respond, or deter any threats. However, Cold War presidents were cautious to 
use this option due to the constraints on United States foreign policy from the bi-polar 
international power structure. The United States during the Cold War attempted to 
achieve its objectives by supporting the Shah in Iran, then by supporting Iraq in the Iran-
Iraq war. The collapse of the bi-polar international power structure allowed the United 
States’ foreign policies in the Middle East not to be constrained by the Cold War’s 
containment strategy. In the uni-polar international power structure the United States 
foreign policy makers no longer feared a world war between the bi-polar world’s 
superpowers; thus enabling the United States to enforce its Middle East foreign policy 
with an offensive military method. Additionally, the United States’ old methods for 
achieving foreign policy had come to a dead-end “The Saudis, having expended huge 
sums on both the Iran-Iraq War and the Persian Gulf War, are hardly in a political or 
military position to become Washington’s surrogate (Spiegel 1997, 304).” Additionally, 
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Egypt and Syria are not in the right political position to be the protector of the Middle 
East (1997, 304). With no Middle East nation capable of maintaining peace and stability 
in the region, the United States took the responsibility. Thus, as the world’s sole 
superpower President Bush placed the United States military in the Middle East to 
provide protection and stability in the region to advance the United States’ foreign policy 
goals “there is no one else.”15 
The Meridian House Address— 
 The Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Edward P. 
Djerejian delivered “the first thorough statement given by any U.S. administration on the 
Islamist question (Gerges 1999, 78).” Djerejian gave this address on June 2, 1992. The 
address began by claiming the Cold War was over, United States foreign policy needed to 
move beyond East-West politics, but toward a policy of “collective engagement.” 
Collective engagement is international cooperation which can be seen by the response to 
Saddam Hussein’s aggression toward his neighbor Kuwait, and gives the Arab-Israeli 
peace negotiations a new hope. The Cold War had limited international responses to 
crises in the Middle East, and it hampered productive talks in the Arab-Israeli peace 
process. 
 Djerejian claimed the United States had two goals in the Middle East region. 
First, peace between Israel and its neighbors, second, pragmatic security and stability for 
the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf’s vast oil supplies. “These are not new goals, 
of course we have striven toward both for decades. What is new is the opportunity 
afforded us by recent global and regional events to make real progress toward achieving 
                                                 
15 President George H.W. Bush, “Address at West Point,” (January 5, 1993): 
from <http://millercenter.virginia.edu>. 
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them.”16 Djerejian is referring directly to the shift to a uni-polar international power 
structure, which enables United States foreign policy to take a more active role in 
protecting its foreign policy interests in the Middle East. Additionally, the security and 
stability within the Middle East is not simply a national interest of the United States, but 
a vital economic interest to the “world economy.” However, the United States is the lone 
superpower, and desires to prevent the reemergence of a bi-polar world, the United States 
must protect the Middle East and its resources. The United States encouraged the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) to engage in “self-defense and collective defense planning.” 
Until the GCC is ready for the burden of providing Persian Gulf security and maintaining 
stability the United States will provide its necessary defense needs. However, Djerejian 
makes it clear that American troops will not be permanently stationed within the Middle 
East, and arm sales are for strengthening Middle Eastern defenses against aggressors, to 
prevent the United States involvement in minor local conflicts. 
 The address averred that United States interests in the Middle East go beyond 
conflict resolution, and stated that the United States’ desire to protect the Middle East’s 
natural resources for itself and the world economy. Additionally, the Bush administration 
wanted to promote human rights, and pluralism within the Middle East. The 
administration recognized there are differences between the United States and the Middle 
East, but similarities do exist. Djerejian also wanted it known the United States does not 
view Islam as the next “ism,” or that Islamism is replacing the Soviet Union as its 
adversary. The United States wants to encourage and promote democracy of a local 
origin within the Middle East. Locally prescribed democracies are important for stability 
                                                 
16 Edward P. Djerejian, “The United States and Middle East in a Changing World,” (June 2, 1992): from 
<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/erc/briefing/dispatch/1992/html/Dispatchv3no23.html>.  
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and identity. The Bush administration promoted Turkey as its democratic model for the 
Middle East; Turkey was viewed as “moderate” and “pro-Western (1999, 95).” Djerejian 
claimed that democratization in the Middle East would allow the region to work closer 
with the West, and be beneficial for the world.  
 The Meridian Address concluded by espousing continued support for “repelling 
aggression and in promoting a negotiated peace to a seemingly intractable conflict in the 
region…. We can get there through close engagement and constructive interaction 
between the United States and all the countries of the Near East region at all levels—
government-to-government, group-to-group, person-to-person, and faith-to-faith.”17 The 
Meridian Address was the George H.W. Bush administration’s only “major” attempt to 
build a stronger relationship with the Middle East, and “set the intellectual framework 
that would influence American policy thinking for years (Gerges 1999, 85, 89).”.  
Summary— 
 United States containment policy during George H.W. Bush administration 
became unraveled due to the collapse of the bi-polar world. Containment policies 
practiced by United States leaders and foreign policymakers since the Truman 
administration were no longer relevant for the uni-polar world. The new world order was 
an attempt by George H.W. Bush to create international order around United States 
leadership. By incorporating multilateral policies, and encouraging increased 
participation from the United Nations, President George H.W. Bush was attempting to 
dispel any notions the uni-polar world would cause the United States to become the 
world’s policeman, or global hegemon.  
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
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 The Persian Gulf War demonstrated the United States’ leadership at the inception 
of the uni-polar world. The United States’ foreign policy in the aftermath of the Persian 
Gulf War took a more active military role in maintaining peace and stability in the 
Middle East region, to protect what the George H.W. Bush administration and previous 
administrations consider vital interests to the United States. A secure and stable Persian 
Gulf and the protection of oil were demands of the increasingly interdependent global 
economy. The United States had attempted to find a partner within the Middle East 
strong enough to protect the region, and work with the United States and its allies, but 
after decades of foreign policy failures the United States used its military to provide the 
Middle East with its security demands. 
 Edward P. Djerejian espoused the George H.W. Bush administration’s policies 
towards the Middle East in the Meridian Address. The administration wanted to promote 
democratization of the Middle East to allow for a close cooperation with the West. The 
policies outlined in the address attempted to reach out and create alliances with the 
United States and the Middle Eastern nations. A key for United States foreign policy in 
the region is security and stability. The Meridian Address outlined the George H.W. Bush 
administration’s ideal development for the Middle East. The foreign policy objectives 
espoused in the address supported active United States military presence in the Middle 
East until the region has achieved peace, stability, prosperity, and locally prescribed 
democracy. 
 The United States did not have decisive strategy in the uni-polar world, as it had 
experienced in the bi-polar world. As the world’s sole superpower the United States took 
a more aggressive and protective role in the Middle East by deploying its military to 
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provide security and stability to the region. The United States’ foreign policy goals in the 
uni-polar world focused on protecting the access to the Middle East’s oil for the global 
economy, democratization, and pushing forward the Arab-Israeli peace process. These 
issues were vital for the United States national interests in the uni-polar world, according 
to the George H.W. Bush administration. Therefore, the United States as the world’s sole 
superpower took an active military role in the Middle East region in order to preserve its 
power position in the uni-polar world, and achieve its foreign policy objectives. 
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—Chapter 5— 
The Bill Clinton Administration 
—The Search for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy— 
 
 
 In chapter 4, I revealed how President George H.W. Bush and his foreign 
policymakers shifted United States foreign policy after the collapse of the bi-polar world. 
The new world order was President George H.W. Bush’s attempt to find a United States 
foreign policy to replace the void left by the Cold War’s containment policy. President 
George H.W. Bush put his new foreign policy in action after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. 
The uni-polar world was going to be led by the United States, and President George H.W. 
Bush was not going to let any aggressor threaten the security or stability of the Middle 
East. As the world’s sole superpower the United States led the multinational effort to 
restore security and stability in the Middle East, thus protecting oil reserves in the region. 
The United States’ foreign policy approach used direct military involvement in the 
region, subsequently defending its power position, the economy, and its allies against 
regional instability. With the collapse of the bi-polar world, the George H.W. Bush 
administration began an attempt to establish close diplomatic ties in the Middle East 
through democratization by promoting the “Turkish model (Gerges 1999, 95),” while 
promoting peace, security, stability and protecting the regions vital oil supplies with the 
United States military.  
 In this chapter, I research how the Clinton administration continued to search for a 
new world order in the uni-polar world. President Clinton attempted to push 
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democratization, and pluralism in the Middle East. Additionally, he practiced a “dual 
containment (Hyland 1999, 172)” of Iraq and Iran, and advanced the Arab-Israeli peace 
process. Not wanting to come across hegemonic, the Clinton administration moved 
“slowly and cautiously with regard to advocating social and political change in the region 
(Gerges 1999, 104).”  In chapter 6, I exam how President George W. Bush continues to 
develop the post-Cold War United States foreign policy in a uni-polar world.  
The Bill Clinton Administration 1993-2001— 
 “Clinton began his presidency by focusing on domestic policy, especially foreign 
economic policy (Ohaegbulam 1999, 49).” However, Clinton was forced to respond to 
missions left uncompleted by the George H.W. Bush administration. Somalia’s civil war 
brought about a United States response by President George H.W. Bush. United Nations 
troops had already been deployed to Somalia when President Bush “deployed 28,000 
U.S. troops to Somalia (Papp, Johnson and Endicott 2005, 208)” for a humanitarian 
mission as part of his new world order policies (Melanson 2005, 242). President Clinton 
supported the United States’ mission in Somalia. Violence and an increasingly 
deteriorating humanitarian situation in Somalia forced the United States troops to use 
deadly force. “In 1993, 18 Americans were killed in a firefight and Congress called for 
the withdrawal of U.S. forces (Papp, Johnson and Endicott 2005, 211).” The Clinton 
administration’s response to the event was PDD-25. “This directive restricted U.S. 
participation in collective security operations under UN auspices. Among other points, 
this directive also rejected the concept of a standing UN Army, and it endorsed U.S. 
participation in UN multilateral missions only when these missions served United States 
interests and had a realistic endpoint (Ohaegbulam 1999, 52).” The failure of Somalia’s 
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Operation Restore Hope, forced the Clinton administration to espouse PDD-25; this 
Presidential Decision Directive stifled the Clinton administration’s plans to use the 
United Nations as the nucleus in its post-Cold War foreign policies.  
In speeches and policy, President Clinton underlined the compatibility of Middle 
Eastern culture and democracy. President Clinton also distanced the idea Islamic culture 
and terrorism is synonymous. The Clinton administration was not quick to judge the 
Middle East or the Islamic community after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, 1995 
bombing in Saudi Arabia, 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, 1998 U.S. 
embassies attacks in Africa, or the 2001 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole. President Clinton 
faced many new foreign policy challenges in the post-Cold War, thus his idealist attempt 
to replace containment was to promote democratization, capitalism, and peace. The 
Clinton administration used pragmatic case-by-case solutions for the Middle East, rather 
than an all-encompassing foreign policy approach such as the Cold War’s containment 
policy (1999, 372).   
Address to the Jordanian Parliament— 
 On October 26, 1994, Jordan and Israel signed the “Treaty of Peace Between the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Israel.” On the same day, President 
Clinton gave a speech to the Jordanian Parliament, commending its devotion to peace, 
and encouraging its continued leadership in the Middle East. The peace treaty was an 
historic moment for the world, and the world’s sole superpower. The signing of the treaty 
allowed the Clinton administration an opportunity to advance the democratization 
movement for the Middle East.  
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 President Clinton in his address to the Jordanian Parliament applauded the nation 
of Jordan for its efforts to create peace in the Middle East. By signing a peace treaty with 
Israel, the Jordanian’s had “rejected the dark forces of terror and extremism” and 
“embraced the bright promise of tolerance and moderation.”18 President Clinton then 
goes on and praises Jordan for embracing “pluralism” and “openness.”19 By establishing 
peace with Israel, President Clinton promised that the United States would work to 
establish Jordan in the globalizing world. Clinton stresses that Jordan “will not stand 
alone.”20 The United States will assist Jordan in strengthening “defense and security 
requirements.”21  
 Apart of Clinton’s foreign policy is that “peace has to produce benefits.”22 
Therefore, peace must create economic stability and prosperity. Additionally, Clinton 
makes the claim that to “live in harmony with our neighbors and to build a better life for 
our children is the hope that links us all together.”23 This rejects the clash of civilization 
thesis debated among certain scholars. By focusing on commonalities, President Clinton 
attempted to breakdown stereotypes, biases, and prejudices between the West and Islamic 
culture. By breaking down what is foreseen as differences between Islamic culture and 
the West, President Clinton attempted to lay the foundation for democratization of the 
Middle East. This is done by revealing the benefits of cooperation with the West, and 
stating that our societies are not that different and can benefit from a relationship of 
                                                 
18 President Bill Clinton, “Remarks to the Jordanian Parliament,” (October 26, 1994) in Amman, Jordan: 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, from 
<http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2889/is_n43_v30/ai_16476946>.  
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
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understanding and respect. “In the Middle East, as elsewhere across the world, the United 
States does see a contest, a contest between forces that transcend civilization, a contest 
between tyranny and freedom, terror and security, bigotry and tolerance, isolation and 
openness. It is the age-old struggle between fear and hope.”24 The fear is from a lack of 
understanding, respect, and acceptance; thus causing a rise in terrorism, and extremism in 
nationalistic and religious forms. President Clinton’s claim is that hope uses our deeply 
rooted commonalities to build a relationship of trust, respect, stability, prosperity, and 
peace. 
 President Clinton’s remarks to the Jordanian Parliament commended Jordan for 
establishing peace with Israel, and expressed the United States’ support of the Jordan and 
Arab-Israeli peace process. Additionally, his speech encouraged other Arab nations to 
follow the path of the Jordanians. This is done by focusing on the benefits to be gained by 
establishing peace with Israel, and by praising the Jordanian efforts to democratize, and 
respecting the values of its citizens. The Clinton administration seizes this opportune 
moment to promote its foreign policy ideals of democratization of the Middle East, its 
support of pluralism, and stressed the common bonds between the East and West. 
President Clinton also applauds Jordan’s efforts to denounce terrorism, and extremism, 
while promoting modernization and acceptance.  
The lack of another superpower in the uni-polar world allowed President Clinton 
to push forward the Middle East peace process. With the quick and decisive victory by 
the United States military in the Persian Gulf War, and its continued presence in the 
Middle East region after the war, the United States used increased military methods to 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
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achieve foreign policy objectives in the Middle East, such as peace, stability, and 
democratization. 
Dual Containment—   
 The Clinton administration’s foreign policy objectives in the uni-polar world were 
to protect its power position and global engagements “by sustaining a steadily growing, 
low inflation, and solvent domestic economy (Melanson 2005, 256);” and pursue policies 
of democratization, thus opening-up the world economy (2005, 256). In order for the 
Clinton administration to achieve these foreign policy goals, it needed to protect the 
United States’ global interest from “backlash states.” 
 President Clinton’s National Security Advisor Anthony Lake developed the 
Clinton administrations plan against “backlash states” in an article in Foreign Affairs, 
“Confronting Backlash States.” Anthony Lake’s article claimed that backlash states are 
“often aggressive and defiant (Lake 1994, 45).” Additionally, Lake claims that the United 
States has a responsibility towards the backlash states as the world’s only superpower to 
develop “a strategy to neutralize, contain and through selective pressure, perhaps 
eventually transform these backlash states into constructive members of the international 
community (1994, 46).” Lake stated the United States’ foreign policy problems towards 
the Middle East’s two backlash states Iraq and Iran, clearly: first, they are threats to non-
proliferation; second, between the two neighboring backlash states they contain 65 
percent of the world’s oil reserves (1994, 47). United States foreign policy goals for the 
Middle East’s backlash states are to “establish a favorable balance of power, one that will 
protect United States interest in the security of our friends and in the free flow of oil of 
stable prices (1994, 47-48).” 
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Iraq and Iran each demonstrated hostile policies towards the United States’ 
interests in the Middle East, thus the Clinton administration began “dual containment” of 
the backlash states. In the post-Cold War, the United States was no longer going to 
protect its vital interests in the Middle East by strengthening one adversary over the 
other. Unlike the Cold War, the United States now used regional allies such as Egypt, 
Turkey, Israel, and Saudi Arabia to strengthen its dual containment (1994, 48). 
Additionally, the presence of the United States military assisted in keeping the backlash 
states under control. The uni-polar world allowed the United States to use increased 
military foreign policy methods to advance its goals. Without the Cold War, Iraq and Iran 
had no superpower to rely-on against the United States’ foreign policies. Dual 
containment took advantage of Iraq and Iran’s recent history. The Iran-Iraq War during 
the 1980’s created a deep mistrust between the two Middle East neighbors. Iraq’s victory 
diminished Iran’s offensive military capabilities, and Iraq’s defeat in the Operation 
Desert Storm weakened its military offensive capabilities (1994, 48-49). Additionally, 
after Iraq invaded its smaller, weaker neighbor the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
became increasingly willing to assist the United States military for deployment within the 
Middle East (1994, 49). Dual containment represents the Clinton administrations foreign 
policy efforts to establish multilateral solutions for Iraq and Iran, use United Nations 
sanctions to legitimize the efforts led by the United States “to protect United States 
strategic interests, stabilize the international system and enlarge the community of nations 
committed to democracy, free markets and peace (1994, 55).”  
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Iraq— 
 Despite the conclusion of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the United States 
maintained vital interests in Iraq, and the Middle East. Since becoming the world’s sole 
superpower the United States expanded its “military presence in the Gulf and the 
establishment of bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain (Nuechterlein 2001, 277).” 
Additionally, the “International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors found that 
Iraq was only a few years away from developing nuclear weapons. Thus, Clinton 
supported UN weapons inspections of Iraq and continuation of sanctions against the 
country (Papp, Johnson and Endicott 2005, 215).” Soon after President Clinton’s 
inauguration, Saddam Hussein continued to show his defiance towards the United 
Nations sanctions, and the United States’ foreign policies. On June 26, 1993, the Clinton 
administration fired cruise missiles on Iraq, when there was evidence suggesting Saddam 
Hussein plotted to assassinate former President George H.W. Bush while touring Kuwait 
earlier that year (Hyland 1999, 171, 172). The Clinton administration maintained a 
substantial amount of military and civilian personnel in Iraq’s southern and northern no-
fly zones. The no-fly zones had been in place since Operation Desert Storm as a means of 
protecting Iraq’s neighbors, and protecting the Iraq citizens from Saddam Hussein. 
Saddam Hussein in 1994 sent Iraqi troops to the Kuwaiti border. The forces withdrew 
after the Clinton administration deployed a carrier group, warplanes and 54,000 troops to 
the Persian Gulf region. In August 1996, Kurdish groups in northern Iraq began fighting. 
The United States military responded to the Kurdish fighting only after Saddam Hussein 
began to assist one Kurdish faction over the others. Once again, the Clinton 
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administration used cruise missile strikes against Iraq military targets and extended the 
southern no-fly zone.  
 After the Iraqi military backed-out of northern Iraq’s Kurdish territory, the 
Clinton administration believed United States foreign policy against Iraq’s aggression 
was working. The northern and southern no-fly zones were protecting Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, and the Kurds; Saddam Hussein seemed to be contained. Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright in a speech on March 26, 1997, stood firm on United States foreign 
policy in Iraq and the Middle East. She encouraged a domestic overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime, and stated how Iraq could become a productive member of the 
international community through democratization, improving human rights, rejecting 
terrorism, complying with the United Nations, and establishing a military of modest 
size.25  However, in 1997 Saddam Hussein “once again challenged the UN, even more 
directly confronting the United States by refusing to admit United States members of the 
UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) to inspect his suspicious weapons facilities (1999, 
175).” Moreover, after much deal making the United States allowed Iraq to sell oil for 
food, if it allowed the weapons inspectors to return to Iraq. Members of the United 
Nations Security Council wanted to avoid military action against Saddam Hussein’s 
despite his defiance.  
The Clinton administration at the beginning was not willing to act unilaterally 
against Iraq, and allowed diplomacy to continue to run its course. However, it was not 
long until the United Nations inspection teams were denied entry into weapons inspection 
sites, and Saddam Hussein still unwaveringly refused inspections of several presidential 
                                                 
25 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, “Speech on Iraq,” (March 26, 1997): 
from <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/970326.html>.  
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palaces (1999, 179). This move by Saddam Hussein pushed the Clinton administration 
towards unilateral action. The cat-and-mouse diplomatic games between the United 
States, and the United Nations against Iraq finally ended in December 1998, when 
“Saddam announced that he would no longer cooperate with the UN teams (Melanson 
2005, 259).” The United States and the British commenced Operation Desert Fox, which 
was “a four-day bombing campaign against Iraq defenses (2005, 259).” The uni-polar 
power structure enabled the United States to act against Iraqi aggression without the need 
for a multinational force, or worrying about upsetting the regions balance-of-power, 
which existed in the bi-polar world. 
The Arab-Israeli Peace Process— 
 A result of the end of the Cold War and  “for the first time since the founding of 
Israel, the outline of a settlement with its Arab neighbors, as well as the Palestinians, was 
beginning to take shape (Hyland 1999, 167).” On September 13, 1993, Yitzhak Rabin 
and Yasir Arafat signed the Oslo Accords, a step toward peace in the Middle East. The 
shift from a bi-polar to a uni-polar world enabled the stalemated peace negotiations 
between Israel and its Arab neighbors move forward. The Arab Nations no longer had the 
Soviet Union for protection, the Persian Gulf War revealed to Middle East nations the 
United States “could and would fight in the Middle East (1999, 156-157).”  
 When the Clinton administration took office in January of 1993, it wasted no time 
trying to assist in establishing peace between Israel and its neighbors Jordan, Lebanon 
and Syria. After the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres 
became the Prime Minister. Eventually, after a tight election Benjamin Netanyahu 
became Israel’s new Prime Minister. After negotiations between Israel, and the 
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Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), with assistance of the United States, Israel 
withdrew from Hebron. With the withdrawal of Israel from Hebron, the “piece by piece 
(1999, 161)” process of peace in the Middle East was stalling. Henry Kissinger wrote an 
article in 1996 claiming that Israel and the Palestinians should work towards final 
negotiations (1999, 161).  
Secretary of State Madeline Albright averred in a speech on August 6, 1997, that 
terrorist strike at a moment of progress in the Middle East peace process. Terrorism will 
not slow-down the Middle East peace process, and the United States will remain steadfast 
in its commitment to Israel’s security. Additionally, Secretary of State Albright stated, 
“we must respond to those who have declared war on peace by waging war on terror—
understanding that forging peace and fighting terrorism are not separate struggles, but 
rather two halves of the same struggle. We cannot succeed in one if we do not prevail in 
both. The path ahead is difficult, but so was the journey already made.”26 Later, in her 
speech she encouraged moving beyond the Oslo Accords, and sides with Henry 
Kissinger’s approach of establishing “permanent status negotiations.” President Clinton 
took on the challenge of perusing “permanent status negotiations” in 1998, by getting the 
Wye River Memorandum signed by Prime Minister Netanyahu, Chairman Arafat and 
King Hussein as an observer. The Wye River Memorandum broke the stalemated peace 
talks, and established a framework for lasting peace, with a promise from President 
Clinton to support “both sides of the endeavor.”27  
                                                 
26 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, “The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process,” (August 6, 1997): 
from < http://www.state.gov/www/statements/970806.html>. 
27 President Bill Clinton, “Remarks at the Wye River Memorandum signing ceremony,” (November 2, 
1998) In Washington, D.C.: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,  
from <http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2889/is_44_34/ai_53449086>.  
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The Arab-Israeli peace process is vital to United States post-Cold War foreign 
policy. The critical goals of the post-Cold War United States foreign policy in the Middle 
East are establish peace, security, prosperity, and democracies. In order for the United 
States to achieve these goals, it must ensure there is an Arab-Israeli peace. With the 
United States military present in the Middle East region, and its leadership role in 
Operation Desert Storm, the United States is capable of pushing forward, and 
encouraging change in the Middle East, and the Arab-Israeli peace process. The 
conditions of the uni-polar world made the United States an “indispensable nation 
(Melanson 2005, 283).”  
Summary— 
 The Clinton administration’s foreign policies towards the Middle East 
demonstrated the United States’ position in the world as sole superpower. The Clinton 
administration worked diligently to open-up the Middle East by promoting 
democratization, pluralism, and peace. The uni-polar world allowed the United States 
greater flexibility in its foreign policies in dealing with the Middle East. The lack of an 
opposing superpower shadowing foreign policy in the region, and with the sole ability to 
act unilaterally, the United States was capable of maintaining its military presence in the 
Persian Gulf region to promote democratization, practice dual containment of Iraq and 
Iran, and push forward the Arab-Israeli peace process. The United States increased its 
involvement in the Middle East, in order to protect the region and establish stability, thus 
maintaining its power position in the uni-polar world by through democratization, 
opening economic markets, and advocating peace. The uni-polar world gave increased 
  77
flexibility to the United States’ foreign policy methods, allowing increased military 
involvement to achieve foreign policy initiatives. 
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—Chapter 6— 
The George W. Bush Administration 
—A New United States Foreign Policy— 
 
 
 In Chapter 5, I illustrated how the Clinton administration moved beyond 
searching for a new world order, to handling foreign policy situations on a pragmatic 
case-by-case basis (Ohaegbulam 1999, 372). The Clinton administration demonstrated 
the United States’ post-Cold War foreign policy was more flexible, and could take a more 
hands-on approach to foreign policy, and use increased militaristic methods in its foreign 
policy since; it was the only nation that could influence unilaterally. President Clinton’s 
foreign policy approach focused principally on economics. In dealing with the Middle 
East, President Clinton pursued foreign policy goals of democratization, opening of 
markets, increasing stability, increasing security, and advocating peace. He kept United 
States troops in the Persian Gulf in order to practice dual containment, promote peace, 
stability, and protect global oil interests. His foreign policy used the United Nations to 
contain Saddam Hussein by issuing economic sanctions, weapons facility inspections, 
and protecting the Middle East’s oil. Additionally, he was not afraid to threaten with 
unilateral military response to Iraq’s defiance of the United Nations and the United 
States. He was also capable of many breakthroughs in Arab-Israeli relations by pushing 
both sides to work out differences as the United States played the role of mediator. 
 In this chapter, I research how the George W. Bush administration changed 
United States foreign policy. The uni-polar world established the United States as the 
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world’s sole superpower and the previous presidential administrations of George H.W. 
Bush and Bill Clinton favored multilateral institutions and global engagement to achieve 
the majority of its foreign policy initiatives in the Middle East (Cameron 2005, 29). The 
George W. Bush administration in its first eight months in office were more “realist and 
unilateralist (Papp, Johnson, and Endicott 2005, 218)” than the previous post-Cold War 
presidents. However, the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the United States changed 
American foreign policy. “The 11 September terrorist attacks signified the end of the 
post-Cold War era in dramatic fashion. The post-Cold War era was characterized by 
pragmatic internationalism in US foreign policy. The new era is characterized by a single 
obsession—the war on terrorism (Cameron 2005, 201).”  
The George W. Bush Administration 2001-2006—   
 George W. Bush began his presidency making drastic changes to United States 
foreign policy. He began exploring the idea of a ballistic missile defense system, rejected 
the Kyoto Protocol, and backed out of the International Criminal Court (Papp, Johnson, 
and Endicott 2005, 218). His administration began pursuing strong unilateralist policies, 
and rejected the concept of the United States as a global peace broker. On the morning of 
September 11, 2001, the George W. Bush presidency would be defined and the world 
changed. 
 The terror attacks on the World Trade Center towers, the Pentagon, and Somerset 
County, Pennsylvania gave the Bush administration new priorities in its foreign policy. 
The foreign policy result of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks was the war on 
terrorism. The Bush administration’s first target in the post-September 11, 2001 world 
was Afghanistan, and the hunt for Osama bin Laden. The Taliban government of 
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Afghanistan had “provided safe haven for bin Laden and al Qaeda’s terrorist training 
camps (2005, 219).” In 2002, President Bush announced the United States’ new 
preemptive defense doctrine. This would allow the United States the ability to take the 
offensive in the war on terror. In 2002, the preemptive defense doctrine espoused by 
President George W. Bush began to focus on Saddam Hussein and Iraq’s weapons of 
mass destruction threat. The Iraq War ended and the United States searched for weapons 
of mass destruction found little if any evidence of a threat, thus far. For this reason “the 
United States emphasized the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the end of his brutality, and 
the democratization of Iraq as its chief war aims (2005, 225).”   
President George W. Bush’s foreign policy advocated freedom in the Middle 
East. The Bush administration’s foreign policy believed that democracy brought freedom 
to a nation, deterrence was an ancient concept that no longer protected the American 
people, and “preeminent military, economic, and political power of the United States was 
conducive to peace and welcomed by other states (Melanson 2005, 352).” President Bush 
stated his support for locally prescribed democracies that are respectful of human dignity, 
accountable to its citizens, and responsible to its neighbors. Basic human rights of 
religion, conscience, speech, assembly, association and press were to be protected. 
Governments are expected to be responsive to its citizens, submit to the will of the 
people, especially when people voted for a change. Governments are to maintain its own 
borders, protect an independent and impartial system of justice, punish crime, embrace 
rule of law, and resist corruption. The new democracies had to limit the reach of 
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government and protect civil society.28 United States foreign policy was no longer aimed 
at protecting, or preserving peace, but rather creating peace by installing democracy, 
through offensive military means. The foreign policy intent of George W. Bush was to 
install democracies in Afghanistan, and Iraq, thus sowing the seeds for freedom, 
modernization, and reform for the rest of the Middle East. Democracy in the Middle East 
is seen as vital for the United States and the world according to President George W. 
Bush’s foreign policy. 
The War on Terror—  
 The United States soon discovered that al Qaeda was responsible for the heinous 
acts of September 11, 2001. On September 20, 2001, President Bush spoke before a joint 
session of Congress and stated, “our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not 
end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, 
stopped and defeated.”29 Terrorism moved to the forefront of United States foreign 
policy, President Bush and his administration were steadfast in its resolve to respond the 
new foreign policy objectives. After giving the Taliban government of Afghanistan the 
ultimatum to provide protection for foreign nationals, diplomats, journalists and aid 
workers the Bush administration also demanded immediate cooperation from the Taliban 
to stop harboring terrorist, shut-down terrorist training camps, turnover all terrorists in 
Afghanistan, and provide the United States full access to inspect the acquiescence of 
these demands. The Taliban government failed to comply. 
                                                 
28 President George W. Bush, “National Security Strategy 2006,” (March 16, 2006): from  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf>.  
29 President George W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress,” (September 20, 2001): from  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.   
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 On October 7, 2001, President George W. Bush announced the United States had 
begun military operations in Afghanistan, as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. The 
war on terror was espoused to be a long sustained war, with uncertain battlefields. The 
path to victory may be long but freedom and the United States will prevail. President 
Bush had already made clear in a speech on September 20, 2001, that “every nation, in 
every region, now had a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the 
terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism 
will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.30 The war on terrorism set as an 
objective to restore freedom and hope to citizens of nations that are ruled by fear and 
oppression. The war on terror’s mission is to “defend not only our (the United States’) 
precious freedoms, but also the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their 
children free from fear.”31 By the United States taking the responsibility of freeing the 
world from terrorist and rogue states, it reveals its intent to create a world accepting of its 
leadership, and influence. Without any rival, or opposition to the United States afforded 
to it by the uni-polar international power structure, it is able to take on a global mission 
and predominately unilateral methods to achieve its policies. 
 The United States and its coalition of allies defeated the Taliban government, and 
disrupted the al Qaeda terrorist network operating in Afghanistan. The war on terrorism 
was moving along slowly, but successfully in Afghanistan as of December 2001. On 
December 11, 2001, the Bush administration broadened the initiatives of the war on 
terror. President Bush gave a speech to the Citadel where his foreign policy goals began 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 President George W. Bush, “President Address to the Nation,” (October 7, 2001): from 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html>. 
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to define themselves further. He began emphasizing the prevention of weapons of mass 
destruction in the hands of terrorist or rogue states. “Rogue states are clearly the most 
likely sources of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons for terrorists…. America's 
next priority to prevent mass terror is to protect against the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and the means to deliver them.  I wish I could report to the American 
people that this threat does not exist—that our enemy is content with car bombs and box 
cutters—but I cannot.”32  
The war on terror’s initiatives would be defined even further by President Bush’s 
2002 State of the Union Address. In his speech, President Bush stated that an “axis of 
evil” is present in the world. North Korea, Iran, and Iraq constituted the axis of evil, 
including its terrorist allies.33 These rogue regimes threaten the peace and stability of the 
world in its pursuit of weapons on mass destruction. More importantly, President Bush 
asserted “that the United States reserved the right to launch preventive attacks on 
looming threats before they had become “clear and present dangers” (2005, 309).”  
In the uni-polar world, the United States has no balance towards its power, 
leaving the Bush administration’s foreign policies capable of implanting a doctrine of 
preemptive warfare. The doctrine of preemption not only applies to the axis of evil, but to 
the regional and local terrorist groups operating globally. President Bush’s foreign policy 
established that “our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and 
resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to 
                                                 
32 President George W. Bush, “President Speaks On the War Effort To the Citadel Cadets.” (December 11, 
2001): from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011211-6.html>. 
33 President George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” (January 29, 2002): from 
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defend our lives.”34 The majority of President Bush’s rhetoric is aimed at the Middle 
East, despite the talk of a global war on terror. The instability in this region is perceived 
as threatening to the United States national interests, and a breeding ground for terrorism. 
The United States has been stationed in the Middle East since the Persian Gulf War, and 
has had influence in the region since the Truman administration in order to protect the 
vast oil reserves.  
Despite the ongoing nature of the war on terror, President Bush in his National 
Security Strategy 2002 outlined the ultimate goal of the United States mission in the war 
on terror. The National Security Strategy revealed the administration’s path to victory, 
and protection of the United States’ national and global interests will be that “we will 
actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade 
to every corner of the world.”35 The United States in the post-Cold War, and the post-
September 11, 2001 world is the only nation capable of leading a war on terror. The uni-
polar world allows the United States to pursue its foreign policy goals, and implement 
them unilaterally if necessary. 
The Iraq War—   
 In 2002, the Bush administration increased pressure towards Iraq by demanding 
the re-entry of United Nations weapons inspectors, compliance with the United Nations 
Security Council resolutions, and to denounce terrorism. Saddam Hussein’s government 
was listed as one of the three nations apart of the axis of evil. June 1, 2002, President 
Bush gave the commencement address at the United States Military Academy at West 
                                                 
34 President George W. Bush, “Commencement Address at West Point,” (June 1, 2002): from 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>. 
35 President George W. Bush, “National Security Strategy 2002,” (September 17, 2002): from 
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Point. In his address, he made clear that any nation seeking or developing weapons of 
mass destruction would be targeted in the war on terror. “Unbalanced dictators with 
weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide 
them to terrorist allies…. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and 
confront the worst threats before they emerge.”36 
 President Bush espoused his concerns over Iraq to the United Nations General 
Assembly on September 12, 2002. There he stressed that regional conflict affected global 
security. However, an immediate threat was rogue states providing deadly technology to 
terrorists. Saddam Hussein has broken all of the United Nations resolutions that Iraq was 
obligated to uphold, and is harboring al Qaeda terrorists. President Bush then revealed his 
foreign policy initiative that underlined the United States’ war on terror, the 
democratization of the Middle East. “Liberty for the Iraqi people is a great moral cause, 
and a great strategic goal. The people of Iraq deserve it; the security of all nations 
requires it. Free societies do not intimidate through cruelty and conquest, and open 
societies do not threaten the world with mass murder. The United States supports political 
and economic liberty in a unified Iraq.”37 President Bush made clear in his speech that if 
Saddam Hussein does not comply with the resolutions by the United Nations Security 
Council, action against Iraq will be taken, and Saddam Hussein will lose his power. The 
ultimate goal of President Bush’s foreign policy for the Middle East is for Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and Palestine to be the leaders in democratic change in the Middle East.   
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 The Bush administration continued pressure on Saddam Hussein to comply with 
the United Nations resolutions. Nevertheless, Saddam Hussein continued his usual 
defiance. President Bush in his 2003 State of the Union Address, stated, “A brutal 
dictator, with a history of reckless aggression, with ties to terrorism, with great potential 
wealth, will not be permitted to dominate a vital region and threaten the United States.”38 
Later, in the State of the Union Address, President Bush made clear the United States 
would strike Iraq if they did not comply with the United Nations. The Bush 
administration’s policies will not allow Iraq to threaten the stability of the Middle East or 
the security of the United States and the world. Iraq’s only option is to “disarm, fully, and 
peacefully.”39  
 As the prelude to war with Iraq concluded, President Bush began pushing the idea 
of freedom in Iraq. Freedom according to the Bush administration would allow Iraq to be 
a beacon in the Middle East for modernization, and hope; thus being a step in the process 
towards peace, stability, prosperity, and openness in the Middle East. The Bush 
administration’s foreign policy towards the region was steadfast. It used nominal 
diplomatic and multilateral methods to attempt to resolve issues within the region it 
believed threaten the United States and its global vital interests. Using the war on 
terrorism as a platform, the Bush administration pursued unilateralist interests in the 
Middle East region. Democratization of the Middle East was seen as the only way to 
reform this region of instability. “The world has a clear interest in the spread of 
democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder. 
                                                 
38 President George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” (January 28, 2003): from  
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39 President George W. Bush, “President Discusses Future of Iraq,” (February 26, 2004): from  
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They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a better life. And there are hopeful signs of a 
desire for freedom in the Middle East…. A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic 
and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region.” 40 
 Saddam Hussein failed to comply with the United Nations Security Council 
resolution 1441, by refusing to disarm Iraq. President Bush then charged the United 
Nations Security Council of not taking initiative, and fulfilling the obligation of its 
position by forcing Iraq to comply. Therefore, President George W. Bush on March 19, 
2003, addressed the nation about the beginning of military operations in Iraq. Operation 
Iraqi Freedom objectives were to remove Saddam Hussein from power, find and destroy 
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities, and bring freedom to Iraq’s citizens. 
 The United States and coalition forces did not take long in capturing Baghdad. On 
May 1, 2003, President Bush announced the major combat operations in Iraq were over. 
In addition, on December 13, 2003 the United States captured Saddam Hussein. 
Meanwhile, the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was not revealing any 
clues, or evidence of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction threat. This turn of 
events in the Iraq War led the Bush administration to begin rallying behind another 
motivation for going to war with Saddam Hussein; thus the United States began focusing 
on Saddam Hussein’s “notorious human rights violations (2005, 317).” President Bush 
had stated before the Iraq War that, “It will be difficult to cultivate liberty and peace in 
the Middle East, after so many generations of strife. Yet, the security of our nation and 
the hope of millions depend on us…. Free people will set the course of history, and free 
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people will keep the peace of the world.”41 Now, after the Iraq War the Bush 
administration’s foreign policy towards Iraq can begin focusing on bring freedom to the 
Iraqi people, in the form of locally prescribe democracy.  
 In the National Security Strategy issued by President George W. Bush on March 
16, 2006, he outlined clearly his foreign policy intentions for “spreading democracy in 
the broader Middle East.”42 Two pillars support the National Security Strategies first; 
make the international community accepting of democracy by promoting “freedom, 
justice, and human dignity,” second, leading the world to create democracies in order to 
establish allies in the war against terror. The United States went to war with the Taliban 
government after it refused to stop harboring terrorists, then the Bush administration used 
preemptive defense to take-down a regional threat in the Middle East by going to war 
with Saddam Hussein. The United States’ only two wars in the post-September 11th 
world have been against Middle East nations. Therefore, the United States’ foreign policy 
in the Middle East has shifted in the post-Cold War due to its power position in the uni-
polar world. The United States in the war on terror is using offensive militaristic foreign 
policy methods to establish conditions favorable to maintaining international order 
around the principals of democratization. “The goal of our (United States’) statecraft is to 
help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their 
citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is the best 
way to provide enduring security for the American people.”43         
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
42 President George W. Bush, “National Security Strategy 2006,” (March 16, 2006): from 
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43 Ibid. 
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Summary— 
 The George W. Bush administration has taken many bold steps in defining its 
vision of United States foreign policy in the post-Cold War. The terror attacks on 
September 11, 2001, caused President Bush to cast aside old policies of deterrence, and 
brought about the United States’ new initiative to create peace, prosperity, and freedom 
through instilling democracy. The Bush administration views democratization vital for 
the United States national security interests, and for global peace and prosperity. As the 
world’s sole superpower the Bush, administration believes that it is the United States’ 
responsibility to bring freedom to world civilizations, especially to the Middle East. 
President Bush’s foreign policies started a two-front war in the Middle East, in order to 
bring freedom, openness, hope, stability, and democracy to Afghanistan and Iraq.  
 The Bush administration’s foreign policies on establishing democracy in the 
Middle East do not stop with Afghanistan and Iraq. It also influenced the Arab-Israeli 
peace process. Palestine democratically elected its first president under multilateral 
pressure lead by the United States. President Mahmoud Abbas became Palestine’s leader 
after President Bush espoused his plans for the Arab-Israeli peace process on June 24, 
2002. President Bush pushed Palestine and Israel to work out a peace that allows them to 
live side-by-side as democratic neighbors in peace, and respect. 
 The uni-polar international power structure does not confine the United States’ 
power. After the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the United States, the Bush 
administration has been beating the war drums. The war on terror took the United States 
to Afghanistan, and Iraq. The United States had become impatient with previous foreign 
policy attempts to preserve peace, and stability in the Middle East. The foreign policies of 
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the United States became vigilant in creating democracy and installing locally prescribed 
democracy. The uni-polar world allows the United States the opportunity to take up this 
bold crusade. As the world’s sole superpower, it is in the United States’ vital national 
interests to protect its economy, allies, and create conditions favorable to its rule. 
President George W. Bush used the uni-polar world’s lack of a counter to United States 
supremacy to implement its foreign policy objectives, achieved through the increased use 
of militaristic foreign policy methods.
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—Chapter 7— 
Conclusion 
 
 
 In the last chapter, I concluded that the uni-polar world allowed United States 
foreign policy during the George W. Bush administration to take an activist role in 
defending freedom by installing democracies in the Middle East. The war on terrorism 
started in Afghanistan aimed at the al Qaeda terrorist networks. The United States and 
coalition forces after ousting the Taliban government began the process of establishing 
democracy in Afghanistan. Then President George W. Bush’s war on terror’s mission 
expanded to prevent rogue states from attaining, or distributing weapons of mass 
destruction. Subsequently, the United States overthrew Saddam Hussein, and began steps 
towards creating democracy in Iraq. The Bush administration’s policies after the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, left nations of the world no choice, you either sided 
with the United States or you were the enemy. The uni-polar world has brought about an 
increase in regional and local instabilities. However, the United States’ superpower status 
enables its policies to force changes that will strengthen the international system 
favorably to the United States as the world’s sole superpower.  
 During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were cautious of 
offensive military involvement, on a permanent basis in the Middle East region. The bi-
polar world made each superpower cautious of one another, thus not wanting to provoke 
the other into action. From President Truman through the foreign policies of Ronald 
Reagan the United States used the foreign policy guidelines of containment towards the 
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Middle East. Cold War presidential administrations issued doctrines that deterred the 
Soviet Union from taking some actions in the Middle East. Another foreign policy 
method was to fund third parties to harass, and disrupt the Soviet Union’s initiatives in 
the Middle East region. When the United States did send troops to the Middle East, it was 
a multinational peacekeeping mission and was temporary in nature; such was the case of 
Lebanon in the early 1980’s. After the 1967 war between Israel and its Arab neighbors, 
many Arab nations grew closer to the Soviet Union as a balance to Israel’s intimate 
connection with the United States. The United States could not act aggressively in 
implementing foreign policy objectives during the Cold War. Preventing war between the 
superpowers was essential to the United States’ containment policy. During the Cold War 
the United States had a constant wiliness to use military force if necessary to repel the 
Soviet Union’s aggression. Cold War presidential administrations placed the United 
States military in the proximity of the Middle East but never used offensive military 
methods to solve local and regional crises in the Middle East.  
 During the Cold War, the United States attempted to gain allies other than Israel 
in the region to limit the Soviet Union’s influence in this vital region. The United States 
attempted to back the Shah in Iran, and then later Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War. Each of these 
Middle Eastern countries turned against the United States in the latter stages of the Cold 
War. Consequently, when the Soviet Union collapsed at the end of the 1980’s, the United 
States had no powerful moderate Arab allies in the Middle East to maintain security and 
stability over the regions critical oil reserves. 
When the bi-polar world collapsed and the United States became the world sole 
superpower, containment no longer was a pragmatic option. In the uni-polar international 
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power structure, no rival to the United States existed. Imperative to the United States’ 
new world power position was maintaining its position in the uni-polar world. Thus, 
United States foreign policy sought to protect regions of vital national interests. The 
Middle East with its vast oil reserves was vital for the United States national interest and 
security. When Saddam Hussein threatened the peace, stability, and oil in the Middle East 
with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, President George H.W. Bush wasted no time forming an 
international coalition against Iraq’s aggression in the Middle East.  
The Persian Gulf War showed the shift from the bi-polar world to the uni-polar 
world. The result of Operation Desert Storm was the establishment of the United States 
military in the Middle East. Additionally, the United States proved to the Arab world it 
would go to war, and win in the Middle East. The United States during George H.W. 
Bush’s presidency advocated the increased use of the United Nations in its foreign policy. 
President George H.W. Bush believed in the United Nations, and did not want the United 
States to be perceived in the uni-polar world as hegemonic. By creating global 
cooperation the George H.W. Bush administration believed the United States could 
achieve its foreign policy goals through multilateral channels, and majority rule. 
When Bill Clinton became President of the United States he pushed for 
multilateral solutions, and democratization of the Middle East. It was his belief that by 
maintaining the military in the Middle East and using the continued deployment of 
military methods to enforce United States foreign policy goals, the United States could 
maintain peace and stability within the region thus protect its global economic oil 
interests. With the United States’ military presence in the Middle East, the Clinton 
administration was capable of a dual containment of Iraq and Iran. The administration 
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used the United Nations as an instrument of foreign policy to maintain security, and 
stability against Iraq. When the United Nations Security Council resolutions failed, the 
United States was not deterred from using unilateral action against Saddam Hussein in 
the form of tomahawk, and cruise missiles fired from established bases, and warships in 
the Middle East.  
The Clinton administration also pursued the democratization of the Middle East. 
The United States encouraged, supported, and championed nations that were viewed as 
modernizing and pro-Western, like Jordan, Turkey, and Pakistan. Encouraging 
democratization, opening markets and capitalism in the Middle East was perceived by the 
Clinton administration as a method towards planting the seeds of peace, stability, and 
modernization of the Middle East. 
The Clinton administration supported adamantly the Arab-Israeli peace process. 
The peace process was vital to the overall stability, peace, and prosperity for the Middle 
East region. The uni-polar world allowed for negotiations between the Arabs and the 
Israelis to move forward. There was no longer the outside influence of the Soviet Union 
the bi-polar world provided. The United States’ quick and decisive victory in Operation 
Desert Storm proved to the Arab world its ability to achieve its foreign policy objectives 
thus, bringing about the first round of final peace negotiations talks. 
September 11, 2001 shaped the George W. Bush presidency. The war on terror 
became the administration’s focus. The previous post-Cold War presidents had advanced 
United States foreign policy in the Middle East to include the use of offensive military 
methods to achieve foreign policy, and the establishment of bases in the region. The 
George W. Bush administration used the uni-polar international power structure to allow 
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the United States military to pursue preemptive foreign policy goals in the Middle East. 
The previous administrations had been satisfied with protecting the Middle East, and 
preserving a form of peace with its military. The George W. Bush administration took 
foreign policy a step further by using the military to install its foreign policy objectives in 
the Middle East. President George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton had pursued the 
democratization of the Middle East by championing seemingly moderate Arab states such 
as Pakistan and Turkey. These countries were to sow the seeds of democracy to the 
surrounding Middle Eastern states. President George W. Bush wanted to protect the 
United States vital interests, and stop having to use the United States military to preserve 
a limited peace in the Middle East as established by President George H.W. Bush and 
Bill Clinton. Consequently, he pursued the democratization of the Middle East after 
conquering the Middle East nations of Afghanistan and Iraq. The uni-polar power 
structure enabled President George W. Bush the ability to deploy the use offensive 
military methods, establish bases permanent in nature in the region to pursue 
longstanding foreign policy objectives in the Middle East.  
The United States’ foreign policy goals in the Middle East of modernization, 
locally prescribed democracies, opening-up of markets, capitalism, stability, security, and 
peace have yet to achieve fruition. However, the uni-polar world allowed the United 
States foreign policy makers an un-restrained hand in the Middle East. The result was 
United States foreign policy no longer threatened the use of force, but deployed the 
military on a seemingly permanent basis in the post-Cold War. The Cold War foreign 
policies of the United States placed the military in the proximity of the Middle East to 
deter aggression with the threat of military force. The uni-polar international power 
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structure that was established in the post-Cold War, allowed United States foreign policy 
to establish bases and deploy offensive military methods to achieve foreign policy 
objectives, to resolve what various administrations have perceived to be local and 
regional instability.  
The bi-polar world constrained the United States’ foreign policy. Are there any 
constraints to United States foreign policy in the uni-polar world? The uni-polar world 
has allowed non-state actors a greater role in the international community. Unfortunately, 
some non-state actors have used the advances in communications technologies to 
organize global terrorist networks such as al Qaeda. The United States’ war on terrorism 
is aimed at nation-states, and non-state actors. Non-state actors are thus becoming an 
effective force in the uni-polar world, by causing the sole superpower to wage war 
against networks it views as detrimental towards its sole superpower status, and its vision 
for the uni-polar world. 
The United States is attempting to create democracy in the Middle East with the 
use of its military. What effect is the war on terrorism going to have on a country’s newly 
formed democracy that has been created through foreign military force? When a country 
has been ruled by force, and then subsequently forced to accept democracy, can a country 
successfully establish a government of freedom of choice, and rule of law when it has 
never been capable of developing government with its own vision, or have no history of 
freedom? The United States as the world’s sole superpower is attempting to create a 
world that will maintain its power position in the uni-polar world. The United States is 
attempting to create global freedom through force, and in the process acting uni-laterally. 
Can the United States maintain neo-isolationists foreign policies that require it to empty 
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its coffers, in order to establish governments accepting of its leadership, and influence? If 
the United States continues its foreign policy objectives in the war on terrorism will it 
cause the United States to overextended its military, and deplete its treasury to the point a 
new international power structure is born? 
 Since the end of the balance of power system in the twentieth century, the United 
States is acting as the world’s sole superpower. Will the United States be capable of 
maintaining its power position, and in creating a world accepting of its global leadership?    
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